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PREFACE 
This thesis attempts to present a detailed evaluation of Brigadier 
General Samuel Bell Maxey and his administration during the fourteen 
month period from December, 1863, to February, 1865, when he served as 
Confederate commander of Indian Territory. Although some research 
study has been done on the Civil War in Indian Territory during 1864, 
none has been completed which details and evaluates events from the 
perspective of Maxey's leadership. The Indian Territory Confederates 
faced a bleak future when Maxey was appointed to command them. They 
had encountered disastrous military defeats and had suffered from in-
effectual leadership. A strong and able commander was needed who 
could at least ward off further defeats. Maxey's work with the prob-
lems he encountered crucially affected Indian Territory during the 
period of his command. To comprehend the sequence of events during 
this time span, it is important to understand Maxey, to know something 
of his personality, his background, his experiences, and his plans 
for Indian Territory. An effort is made to present a comprehensive 
and accurate portrayal of Maxey, his administration, and those influ-
encing him. 
The author extends appreciation to the staff of the Oklahoma 
State University Library for assistance in locating the primary source 
materials used in this thesis. She also thanks Mrs. Marie Keene of 
the Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art in Tulsa, Okla-
homa, for special help in locating and reproducing a large number of 
iii 
items from the Maxey Papers. My deepest appreciation for infinite 
patience and assistance is equally divided. Dr. LeRoy H. Fischer, 
Professor of History at Oklahoma State University, guided me through 
nine academic years and gave much needed advice, encouragement, and 
support. This thesis topic was the product of his thinking, and this 
study would not have been completed without his research and editorial 
expertise, together with his understanding and forbearance. My hus-
band, Herschel, contributed an equal amount of patience and support. 
Without his extraordinary gifts of understanding and intelligence, 
this work would not have been. In addition, I am grateful to Dr. Odie 
B. Faulk, Professor of History at Oklahoma State University, who 
critically evaluated this study and made many valuable suggestions 
for its improvement. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 
I. THE YEARS BEFORE INDIAN TERRITORY. 
II. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS 
III. INDIAN AFFAIRS 
IV. MILITARY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 
V. MAXEY I S REMOVAL AND POSTWAR CAREER 






. . . 
. . . 
. . . 












THE YEARS BEFORE INDIAN TERRITORY 
In December, 1863, as Brigadier General Samuel Bell Maxey rode 
across the Texas prairie toward Indian Territory headquarters at Fort 
Towson, he moved closer to his new position in one of the most diffi-
cult commands in the Confederacy. The Civil War in Indian Territory 
during 1863 had been disastrous.for the Confederate troops and their 
commander, Brigadier General William Steele. During the year, Steele's 
forces in Indian Territory, under the immediate command of Brigadier 
General Douglas H. Cooper, had been defeated in every major military 
engagement within the area. Federal troops had posted victories at 
Webbers Falls, Fort Gibson, and finally in mid-July of 1863 at the 
pivotal Battle of Honey Springs, the largest engagement of the Civil 
War in Indian Territory. The Confederates not only had lost control 
of Fort Gibson, but also of Fort Smith, and had been forced to re-
treat from the Arkansas River to the Red River valley. By the latter 
part of 1863, the Confederates dominated an area less than half the 
size of the territory they had gained in 1861. 1 
This series of disastrous defeats was the result of numerous 
1 
Joseph B. Thoburn and Muriel H. Wright, Oklahoma: !. History 
of the State and Its People (4 vols., New York: Lewis Historical 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1929), Vol. I, pp. 346-347; Lary Charles 
Rampp, "The Twilight of the Confederacy in Indian Territory, 1863-
186511 (Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, Oklahoma State University, 
Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1968), pp. 33-35. 
2 
factors, The most obvious and most discouraging was the shortage of 
adequate equipment, supplies, and serviceable weapons, The demoral-
ized troops were undisciplined, and leadership, especially among the 
Indian troops, was lax. The rate of desertion was alarming, Not so 
openly exposed, yet most demoralizing of all, was the paucity of 
harmony among officers of high rank, a problem caused by personal 
ambitions. Cooper, in command of the Indian Brigade, had been agitat-
ing for command of the Indian Territory before Steele's arrival in 
December, 1862. He had been implicated in some of the incidents lead-
ing to the retirement of Steele's predecessor, Brigadier General Albert 
Pike. It had been Cooper's hope to replace Pike as commander, and he 
was greatly displeased when Steele was appointed, Cooper continued to 
labor diligently and abusively in his attempts to obtain the command 
position, Although Cooper's efforts were fruitless, Steele was dis-
couraged by general conditions in Indian Territory and the division 
within the Indian forces over its leadership, and he asked to be re-
lieved of command in December, 1863. It was not the zealous Cooper 
who inherited this coveted position but Maxey, who was called upon to 
bring order and reform to the chaotic conditions within Indian Terri-
2 tory. 
Maxey was born at Tompkinsville, Monroe County, Kentucky, on 
March 30, 1825, but spent his childhood in Albany, Clinton County, 
2Annie H. Abel, The American Indian~ Participant in the Civil 
War (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1919), pp. 310-311; Thoburn 
and Wright, Oklahoma: ~ History of the State and·~ People, Vol. I, 
p. 347; Special Order No. 214, December 11, 1863, United States War 
Department, War of the Rebellion: ~ Compilation of the Official~-
cords of the Union and Confederate Armies (70 vols., 128 books, 4 
series-;-washington:~overnment Printing Office, 1880-1901), Ser. i, 
Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, p. 104, hereafter cited as Official Records. 
3 
Kentucky, His father, Rice Maxey, originally from Virginia, was of 
Huguenot extraction. His mother was the daughter of Samuel Bell of 
Albemarle County, Virginia. Rice Maxey, a lawyer, served as clerk of 
circuit and county courts in Albany for many years. Samuel Maxey was 
educated in the connnon schools of Clinton County. In 1842, through the 
influence of United States Senator Bryan y. Ownley of Kentucky, Maxey 
obtained an appointment to the United States Military A,:ademy at West 
Point, New York. He attended the academy with several cadets who 
were to become significant military leaders in the Civil War. Among 
these were Earl Van Dorn, James Longstreet, Ulysses S. Grant, and, in 
Maxey's graduating class of 1846, Thomas J. Jackson and George E. 
Pickett. 3 
Upon graduation, Maxey was connnissioned a second lieutenant and 
assigned to the Seventh Infantry Regiment of the regular army. His 
first encounter with army duty was against hostile forces in the 
Mexican War, from 1846 to 1848. He was sent immediately upon gradua-
tion to Monterrey, Mexico; then he served under Major General Winfield 
Scott at the siege of Vera Cruz, and in the battles of Cerro Gordo, 
Contreras, Churubusco, and Molino del Ray. He distinguished himself 
at Contreras and Chururbusco, and was brevetted a first lieutenant for 
his valuable and gallant service. He took part in the siege and capture 
3Allen Johnson, Dumas Malone, Harris E. Starr, Robert L. Schuyler, 
Edward T. James, eds., Dictionary of American Biography (22 vols., New 
York: Charles S.cribner's Sons, 1928-1958), Vol. XI, pp. 435-436; 
Clement A. Evans, ed., Confederate Military History (12 vols., Atlanta: 
Confederate Publishing Co., 1899), Vol. XI, pp. 246-248; Ezra J. Warner, 
Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Connnanders (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, 1959), p. 216; Louise Horton, ed., 
"Samuel Bell Maxey on the Coke-Davis Controversy," Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, Vol. LXXII, No. 4 (April, 1969), pp. 519-521. 
4 
of Mexico City, and again was highly commended for his actions. Scott 
appointed him provost of a Mexican district and commandant of a picked 
company in the city guard. In June, 1848, as the war ended, Maxey re-
turned to the United States and was stationed at Jefferson Barracks, 
near St. Louis, Missouri. After the excitement and activity of wartime 
action, it was not long before the routine and monotony of garrison 
life became tiresome and boring. He decided to return to civilian 
life, and resigned his commission in September, 1849. 4 
With his military career seemingly behind him, Maxey returned to 
Albany, Kentucky, and his family. He began to study law under the 
beneficial direction of his father, and within a year he had learned 
enough to enable him to practice. He was admitted to the Kentucky 
State Bar in 1850. He served as clerk of the county and circuit 
courts, and as master in chancery in Albany from 1852 to 1856. While 
building his law practice, Maxey met and successfully courted Marilda 
Cassa Denton. She was the daughter of George N. Denton, a Baptist 
preacher and farmer from Overton County, Tennessee. They were married 
on July 19, 1853. Within four years after their marriage, the 
decision was made to move the law practice of Rice and Samuel Maxey to 
Paris, Lamar County, Texas. The move shifted Maxey's interest to a new 
and developing state and its problems. Texas remained his home and one 
of his main interests throughout his life. He practiced law in Paris 
until the outbreak-of the Civil War in 1861. During this period he 
served as district attorney for Lamar County, Texas, in 1858 and 1859. 
4Ibid., p. 519; Johnson, Malone, Starr, Schuyler, James, eds., 
Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. XI, p. 435; Evans, ed., Confeder-
ate Military History, Vol. XI, pp. 246-248. 
Originally sympathetic to the Whig party, Maxey became a Democrat and 
voted for John C. Breckinridge in the presidential election of 1860. 
Elected to the Texas State Senate in 1861, he declined the seat to 
5 join the Confederate forces soon after the war began. 
5 
Maxey organized the N~nth Texas Infantry Regiment and was commis-
sioned its colonel in September, 1861. His unit was assigned to the 
army of General Albert Sidney Johnston in Kentucky. Maxey was pro-
moted to brigadier general on March 4, 1862, and with his brigade, 
was ordered to Chattanooga, Tennessee, by Lieutenant General Edmund 
Kirby-Smith, commander of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department. 
He was given several separate and important trusts. During the summer 
of 1862, he commanded the forces scouting Major General Don Carlos 
Buell's army on the Tennessee River. In the fall of 1862, he was 
assigned the duty of fitting out a large command for Kentucky. In all 
these tasks he received the commendation of the officers placed over 
him. He served with distinction in battles near Bridgeport and Battle 
Creek, Kentucky. He so impressed General Braxton Bragg with his 
great activity that he honored Maxey by complimenting him in a general 
order. Bragg called Maxey's routing of a Federal force one of the 
6 most dashing and daring achievements of the day. 
5Johnson, Malone, Starr, Schuyler, James, eds., Dictionary of 
American Biography, Vol. XI, pp. 435-436; Evans, ed., Confederate 
Military History, Vol. XI, pp. 246-248; Clifford McReynolds, comp., 
Biographical Directory of the American Congre!;ls, 1774-1961 (Washingtqn: 
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1277. 
6Johnson, Malone, Starr, Schuyler, James,eds., Dictionary of 
American Biography, Vol. XI, pp. 435-436; Evans, ed., Confederate 
Military History, Vol. XI, pp. 246-248; Samuel Bell Maxey to S. S. 
Anderson, May 20, 1864, Samuel Bell Maxey Papers, Thomas Gilcrease 
Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma, hereafter 
cited as Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
6 
Early in 1863, he was actively engaged in East Tennessee and at 
Port Hudson commanding his brigade of Louisiana and Tennessee troops. 
He was next assigned to the anny of General Joseph E. Johnston in 
Jackson, Mississippi, where his command participated in the Vicksburg 
campaign, In August, 1863, Maxey was assigned to the Trans-Mississippi 
Department and ordered to report to the District of Arkansas head-
quarters in Little Rock, Arkansas, under the command of Lieutenant 
7 General Theophilus H· Holmes. When the men of Maxey's Brigade were 
infonned of his new assignment, the officers under his command praised 
his qualities and expressed regret at their loss in a letter directed 
to him: 
We cannot refrain from expressing our unfeigned sorrow 
that the fortunes of war should at this time deprive us of 
your valuable counsel, your untiring energy, and your self-
sacrificing devotion to every interest of your command. 
Gladly do we bear testimony to your untiring devotion to the 
welfare of your command and to the success of the ho\y cause 
we all love so well. In sunshine and in stonn you have been 
our leader, our guide and counsellor and no effort has been 
wanting on your part to make your command efficient in 
accomplishing the great8object of our struggles, our. 
country's independence. 
Shortly after his transfer, Maxey requested and received pennis-
sion for a leave of absence in October, 1863. This reassignment pre-
sented an opportune time to request a leave. He had been granted only 
one absence of seven days, and two fifteen-day sick leaves since his 
entrance into the Confederate army in 1861. Upon his return on 
7Johnson, Malone, Starr, Schuyler, James, eds., Dictionary.£!. 
.American Biography, Vol. XI, pp. 435-436; Evans, ed., Confederate 
Military History, Vol. XI, pp. 246-248; Special Order No. 196, August 
18, 1863, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 970-971. 
8Letter from Maxey's Brigade, Mobile, Alabama, to Maxey, September 
7, 1863, Maxey papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
December 11, he was authorized by Kirby-Smith to head the District of 
Indian Territory. Kirby-Smith conceded that Maxey might meet the same 
fate as the previous commanders in Indian Territory, but he expressed 
the belief that he would as likely succeed as any other general he 
9 had. 
Maxey was well qualified to fill the difficult command of Indian 
Territory. The problems he faced were ones in which he had some ex-
perience. The assignment called for strong, creative leadership that 
stressed command in combat second to administration and logistics. 
With his military background at West Point, in Mexico, and in the 
7 
first years of the Civil War, Maxey could feel some measure of security 
in the technical problems. He had encountered: a variety of duties and 
had executed all tasks to the approbation of his superiors. His study 
of the law and his legal practice had sharpened his rhetoric and pre-
pared him well for the job of inspiring and encouraging his troops. 
Perhaps most important of all, Maxey was very familiar with the area. 
Having lived in Texas for four years before the Civil War, he knew 
the geography of Indian Territory and northern Texas. His concern for 
his adopted state insured his diligence and care of the buffer area of 
Indian Territory. Having never really failed at an important task, 
Maxey could bring a confident, positive attitude, and a vigor of spirit 
to. tackle the problems of a neglected and utterly demoralized command. 
9special Order No. 214, December 11, 1863, Official Records, Ser. 
i, Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, p. 1094; Anderson to Maxey, October 24, 1863, 
Maxey to Anderson, May 20, 1864, and Maxey to Williamson, June 3, 
1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
CHAPTER II 
ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS 
The conditions Maxey faced upon arrival in Indian Territory in 
December, 1863, were deplorable. He encountered a multitude of crucial 
administrative, logistic, and military problems that had accumulated, 
fermented, and expanded for more than a year. Many of the problems 
were of the nagging, never-ending variety. Their solution depended 
on the cooperation of his entire command, the support of his superiors, 
and the backing of those commanders in close proximity to his area. 
It was seldom possible to receive the cooperation of one group, very 
rarely the support of two, and never all three. Maxey had been ade-
quately warned of the difficulty of the position by Kirby-Smith. He 
was also aware of the short, turbulent terms of his predecessors. It 
appeared he might have a chance of succeeding where others 'had failed 
because he took with him to Indian Territory not only his experience, 
but many other assets. He was enthusiastic and positive. He was 
familiar with the terrain and its importance to the defense of northern 
Texas. He was concerned for the welfare of the indigent Indian popu-
lation. His fiery rhetoric, vibrant energy, and determination added 
much to his value as a commander. Once in his command, he wholly com-
mitted himself and his resources. 
Apart from the many negative aspects of the Indian Territory 
command, there were positive points to benefit Maxey. The position 
8 
required a great deal of work and responsibility. While failure in 
the situation appeared likely, there was also the possibility of un-
paralleled military success and personal satisfaction. A friend, 
Samuel~. Roberts, wrote: 
Northern Texas and the Indian Department have been 
neglected so long that they have become the most difficult 
and the most responsible conunand$ in the Trans-Mississippi 
Department~ I tremble for you. A great name is in store for 
you or you fall into the ranks of failures, the latter may 
be your fate, and might be the fate of any man, even after 
an entire and perfect devotion of all one's time and talent, 
for want of the proper means. In military matters these 
things are never considered. Success is the only criterion--
a good rule, upon the whole, though in many instances it 
works great injustice. Good and deserving men fall, and 
accidental heroes rise in the scale, kicking their less 
fortunate brothers from the platform.l 
Having the full weight of the awesome Indian Territory command 
was but a challenge to Maxey, and he accepted the position with posi-
tive determination. There were also personal compensations in the 
location, for he was only a few miles from his wife and family living 
in Paris, Texas. It was possible for him to visit his home, and on 
occasion, for Mrs. Maxey to visit at Fort Towson. He was able to 
l 
share with her, and their adopted daughter Dora, luxury items captured 
in raids, wild game, fruits, and other goods. He was also able more 
closely to watch and care for his home and land holdings. His future 
political aspirations in Texas could possibly be affected positively 
by his actions in Indian Territory. Whether the success and good 
points would outweigh the failures and negative aspects of the Indian 
Territory command assignment could only be determined at the war's 
1 
Roberts to Maxey, February 1, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, 





The result of the neglect of the problems in Indian Territory was 
evident in the severely demoralized troops Maxey saw on his arrival in 
1863. The crucially low morale was not sudden but had grown steadily 
and insidiously. The reasons for this condition were complex, inter-
twined, and overlapping. Subsistence supplies were poor in quality 
and inadequate in quantity, arms were scarce, and ammunition poor. 
There was also dissension, indecision, and scant organization in the 
command positions. The disastrous military defeats suffered by the 
Confederacy in 1863 were but a reflection of this demoralization. 
Federal troops began early that year to move southward; Union 
leaders wanted to control the area in order to isolate Texas and 
cripple it as a food producer for the Confederacy. Under the command 
of Colonel William A. Phillips, 3,000 Federals began to push into 
Indian Territory in January. They continued to advance until by April, 
1863, they had reached and retaken Fort Gibson with little serious re-
sistance from the Confederates. This post was the center of Federal 
military operations in Indian Territory until the end of the war. 
After the surrounding area was secured, the next significant movement 
of the Union forces was in mid-April. Federal troops made a night 
march of thirty miles and surprised Colonel Stand Watie's command at 
Webbers Falls. The Confederate Cherokees had met there to elect a 
chief in opposition to the Union Cherokee chief, John Ross. Watie was 
routed and the encampment destroyed. For the next several months the 
2s. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, January 13, 1864, January 16, 1864, 
March 17, 1864, October 27, 1864, and October 19, 1864, Maxey Papers, 
Gilcrease Institute. 
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Confederates, under the command of Watie, harassed Union forces and 
engaged in several skirmishes which were of little help to their cause. 
They succeeded only in arousing the concern of the commander of the 
3 Kansas District, Major General James G. Blunt. 
The new Confederate commander, Brigadier General Steele, assumed 
office at Fort Smith on January 8, 1863. He waited there for the rein-
forcements and supplies which he had requested. He hoped with these 
added men and equipment to stop the Federal offensive in the months 
ahead and drive their force out of Fort Gibson. The increased activity 
of Confederate skirmishers had moved the Union commanders to activate 
their troops before a possible combination of forces from the South 
could move against Fort Gibson. Their point of attack was the Confed-
erates quartered at Honey Springs station on the T~xas Road under the 
command of Brigadier General Cooper. The engagement commenced in the 
morning of July 17 and by late afternoon the Confederates had retreated 
to a point a mile beyond Honey Springs, about twenty-five miles south-
west of Fort Gibson. The Confederate forces had fled in hasty disor-
ganization with unusually heavy losses, totaling 186 killed, wounded, 
and missing. There was no comparison in the discipline and equipment 
of the forces. The Federals had not only better arms for their troops, 
but also more artillery. The ammunition of Cooper's troops was of very 
poor quality and almost worthless. Brigadier General Steele at Fort 
Smith took the field in person as the Battle of Honey Springs developed 
3Rampp, "The Twilight of the Confederacy in Irfdian Territory, 1863-
1865," pp. 26-29; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: ~ History of the State 
and Its People, Vol. I, pp. 343-345; Sharon Dixon Wyant, "Colonel 
William A. Phillips and the Civil War in Indian Territory" (Unpublished 
Master of Arts Thesis, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 
1967), PP• 39-41. 
in order to assist the beleaguered Confederates, but arrived on the 
scene an hour after the engagement was over. The Union troops under 
Major General Blunt followed up their victory with the capture of 
4 
Fort Smith on September 1, 1863. 
12 
The morale of the Confederate troops in Indian Territory then fell 
to a new low. Desertions from the white forces were wholesale, danger-
ously depleting an already smali;~ The reasons for their failure 
were buried deeply in a CQmPlex combinati<m of conditions, and not lack 
of courage, skill, or loyalty. The troops that had been expected to 
fight valiantly and fervently were unpaid, poorly clothed and fed, and 
deficient in hospital, medical, and surgical equipment. They were 
inadequately armed with either unserviceable firearms, poor ammunition, 
or none at all. The condition and age of their weapons made them an 
unequal match for the Federal troops. Discipline was lax, especially 
among the Indian troops, as they insisted O!n electing their own, more 
lenient, officers. Hardships of military service had resulted in the 
loss of pr~tically all usable horses. Not to be ignored also was 
the divhion among the commanding officers, Brigadier General Steele 
anct.Brigadier General Cooper. Cooper resented Steele and had worked 
in oppos'ition to Steele's command since his arrival at Fort Smith. 
This poor harmony divided the Indians into two camps. Cooper and his 
Indian friends blocked all of Steele's attempts at troop reorganization 
and all hope for any aggressive or venturesome leadership. The Cooper 
faction had plans for troop reorganization that would secure promotions 
4Ibid., pp. 53-55; Rampp, "The Twilight of the Confederacy in 
Indian Territory, 1863-1865," pp. 29-33; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: 
~ History of the State and Its People, Vol. I, pp. 345-346. 
for them. The entanglements grew until their solutions were beyond 
Steele, and he then asked to be relieved. 5 
Into this unenviable situation came Maxey, expecting to bring 
order and reorganization. He hoped not only to secure the area but 
also t·o mount an offensive to recapture the lost portions of Indian 
Territory. It soon became apparent to Maxey that conditions would 
13 
not allow an offensive action for some time. He reported shortly after 
his arrival that the only force available for an engagement was Colonel 
Richard M. Gano•s Texas Brigade of a little over 1,000 men. This 
number was subject to much shrinkage as desertions mounted unchecked; 
one regiment reported 25 desertions, only to be eclipsed a few days 
later by 200 from another regiment. The reduced brigade would be un-
able to hold against a serious attack. Thus Maxey sent his best 
regiment, along with two companies, into Texas after the deserters. 
He issued general orders encouraging those skulking from their command 
or avoiding conscription to enlist or return to t.heir command. Any who 
did not obey were subject to arrest, and all patrols and pickets were 
ordered to be alert for these men. Maxey concluded that there was no 
feasible way to get an effective total of the Indian Brigade, as its 
units were scattered throughout Indian Territory. There was, Maxey 
determined, a cavalry and an artillery force, but no infantry16 
,! 
With these troops and under such conditions, Maxey•s duties ap-
5Abel, The American Indian~ Participant in the Civil War, pp. 
310-311; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: A History of the State and 
Its People, Vol. I, pp. 347, 353-354; Maiey to Anderson, February 7, 
1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. LIII, pp. 963-966. 
6Ibid.; General Order No. 7, January 14, 1864, and General Order 
No. 30, March 15, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
14 
peared Herculean. He had not only to control the troops, but provide 
supplies, defend, and preserve Indian Territory and northern Texas. 
His duties as ex officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs were not 
clearly defined, but included the need to feed the indigent Indians 
and settle difficulties between the tribes. Maxey evaluated his situa-
tion, and quickly and diligently began his reorganization plans. He 
believed that a vigorous execution of his program for the reconstruc-
tion of Indian Territory would produce enough improvement to plan an 
offensive for the following spring. It was his feeling that the natural 
line of defense was not the Red River but the Arkansas River, and all 
efforts should be made to return to that line. He was very eager to 
recapture Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, and this prevailing thought 
dominated his entire military planning. These forts not only had 
strategic value as Maxey viewed them, but their recapture would be 
especially beneficial to morale and his plans for restructuring. 7 
Fundamental to all other problems was troop reorganization. This 
was a tremendous and difficult task which had already caused much dis-
cord between Cooper and Steele. The initial effort was to form the 
Indian troops into brigades, with two plans being considered. One 
plan favored by both Lieutenant General Kirby-Smith and Brigadier 
General Maxey involved two brigades under the leadership of Colonel 
Watie and Brigadier General Cooper. The other plan would divide the 
Indians into three brigades, recognizing especially the Choctaws, the 
Cherokees, and the Creeks. These troops would be under the leadership 
7Maxey to Boggs, December 26, 1863, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 1112-1113; S. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, 
December 29, 1863, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
15 
of Colonel Tandy Walker, commanding the Choctaw-Ch,ickaeaw units; 
Colonel D. N. Mcintosh would be in charge of the Creek-Seminole force; 
and Colonel Stand Watie would lead the Cherokees. 8 
Under the second plan, Cooper would serve as the commanding offi-
cer of the three brigades. Kirby-Smith was reluctant to place Cooper 
in this command position because he had not gained a favorable picture 
of his worth. He was also a friend of Brigadier General Steele, and 
he felt any promotion of Cooper would be a reflection on Steele. 
While openly favoring the two brigade system, he directed Maxey to 
place all of the Indian troops under the authority of Cooper and, for 
a short time, the white troops under Steele until Maxey could familiar-
ize himself with his new command. The inconsistency in Kirby-Smith's 
actions was obvious and Maxey was left to interpret his superior's 
d . 9 esires. The indecision and turmoil continued until late January, 
1864, when Kirby-Smith placed the entire burden of troop reorganization 
on Maxey. He was informed by Major George Williamson, Kirby-Smith's 
Assistant Adjutant General, that "in regard to the organization of the 
Indian troops into two or three brigades, he [Kirby-Smith] wishes you 
to exercise your own judgment. Having acted upon the best information 
you can obtain, in order to promote their efficiency he [Kirby-Smith] 
8 
Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, and Cooper to Scott, Janu-
ary, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 2, pp. 856-858, 
859-862; Abel, The American Indian as Participant in the Civil War, 
pp. 314-318. 
9Ibid.; Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, and Cooper to Scott, 
January, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 2, pp. 856-
858, 859-862; Anderson to Maxey, December 11, 1863, Maxey Papers, 
Gilcrease Institute. 
10 doubts not he will approve your action. 11 
16 
While preferring the two brigade system, Maxey was not indifferent 
to the possibilities of the three brigade system. He felt that the 
system could promote a feeling of tribal alliance and be more consistent 
with the treaties the Indians had made with the Confederacy. He also 
felt that it would be a good recruiting arrangement, as it would enable 
them to fight as nations. The decision, however, was not left to 
Maxey's discretion, for in the matter he encountered the will and am-
bition of Brigadier General Cooper. Cooper was not content to allow 
the regular mechanics of the military hierarchy to work in opposition 
to his desires. Thus, he wrote Kirby-Smith for clarification of his 
position in Indian Territory, and he was assured that he was to remain 
under the conunand of Maxey. This was not the answer for which he had 
hoped. Pressure was then applied by the Indians in behalf of Cooper, 
in letters and in the presence of E. C. Boudinot, the Cherokee dele-
gate to the Confederate Congress in Richmond. The pleadings of the 
Indians and Cooper proved fruitful. On February 22, 1864, in a letter 
to the President of the Grand Council of the Six Confederate Indian 
Nations, President Jefferson Davis endorsed the three brigade plan 
placing Cooper in conunand of the Indian troops. 11 
The order for the organization of three brigades was officially 
10williamson to Maxey, January 25, 1864, Official Records, Ser. 
i, Vol. XX.XIV, Pt. 2, PP• 917-918. 
11Ibid., pp. 318-319; Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, Ander-
son to Cooper, February 20, 1864, and Cooper to Davis, February 29, 
1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XX.XIV, Pt. 2, pp. 856-858, 1007-
1008; Portlock to Maxey, January 13,, 1864, and Maxey Circular, May 14, 
1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
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issued on June 1, 1864. Under instructions from Kirby-Smith, Maxey 
issued an order for the requisition of troops to complete three full 
regiments for each brigade. Cooper was still not satisfied with the 
promotion. He wanted the entire command of Indian Territory, and 
second best was not good enough, so he drafted a letter of protest to 
President Davis. He tried to persuade the administration that because 
of an appointment as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in September, 
1862, he had a claim on the higher position. "The order placing me 
on duty as superintendent of Indian affairs," the irate Cooper wrote, 
"seems to have been ignored by Lieutenant General Holmes and his sue-
cessor in command of the Trans-Mississippi Department. 11 He further 
complained: "Where I have always been ready to serve in any capacity 
••• it is not agreeable or just to be unceremoniously thrust aside by 
others more in favor with the commanding officers of this depart-
12 
ment. 11 Cooper did not immediately receive the clarification of his 
position that he wanted, but he never ceased his efforts. His struggle 
for advancement continued undiminished throughout 1864. Maxey was not 
unaware of Cooper's efforts, but he did not allow them to deter him 
from his command duties. 13 
Maxey's program of troop reorganization in Indian Territory con-
tained many aspects. Although the Cherokee and Choctaw-Chickasaw 
brigades were ready for formation as early as January, 1864, the three 
brigade system was not completed until October, 1864. Until that time, 
12 
Cooper to Davis, February 29, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 2, p. 1007. 
13rbid.; Special Order No. 227, September 29, 1862, ibid., p. 
1008; Special Order No. 7, January 12, 1864, and Anderson to Cooper, 
February 20, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
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the Creek-and Seminole regiments had been a part of the First Indian 
Cavalry Brigade of the Cherokee Nation under Brigadier General Stand 
Watie. In an attempt to bring all able-bodied Indians into service, 
Maxey hoped to produce other conditions favorable to their enlistment. 
He understood the necessity of keeping a core of reliable and intelli-
gent white troops with the Indian brigades. These troops would serve 
several purposes. They would act as scouts, couriers, and instructors 
for the Indians. The need for responsible officers to send reliable 
reports, and help with training and instruction, was imperative. 
Maxey also made it known that all old regiments would be retained 
when possible, and that the new ones would conform to tribal struc~ 
14 ture. 
Maxey also hoped to quickly inaugurate a reliable spy system to 
report on Federal activities. He used only those men in whom he had 
confidence. Information was easily purchased, but he felt it was a 
waste of money if his informants were not personally known to be 
trusted. These. men were responsible for supplying a great deal of 
information, since some of them were living behind Federal lines and 
were able to obtain many details. In addition, Maxey kept scouting 
parties under his personal corrnnand constantly patrolling the Federals. 
He asked to have special men he knew and trusted sent to his corrnnand 
for scouting purposes. The Trans-Mississippi Department was interestea 
in only accurate accounts of troop movements and troop strengths, and 
14Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: ! History of the State and Its 
People, Vol. I, p. 359; Maxey Circular, June l,-Y864, Offici~ ---
Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 4, pp. 639-641; General Order No. 
63, October 13, 1864, ibid., Vol. LIII, Pt. 1, p. 1023; Maxey to 
Anderson, January 12, 1864, ibid., Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 2, pp. 856-858. 
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Maxey was determined to supply reliable information. 15 
Constantly plaguing Maxey throughout his tenure in the Indian 
Territory conunand was the nagging hardship of obtaining supplies for 
his troops. He tried again and again to induce the Trans-Mississippi 
headquarters in Shreveport, Louisiana, to send arms and transportation 
for hauling supplies from Texas, where most connnissary goods were. ob-
tained. All his efforts to acquire supplies were of little or no 
avail, and he received only unfilled promises. Maxey's constant plead-
ings for weapons to arm his men led to nothing but frustration. 
The first. report of the connnand's ordnance officer to Maxey por-
trayed a desperate situation. There were 1,084 unarmed men and 183 
unserviceable arms. The firearms were of almost every variety and 
usually worthless. The weapons that were in Indian Territory con-
sisted of unreliable, poorly constructed Texas rifles that were likely 
to explode when fired, a few Enfields, a very few Mississippi rifles, 
some double-barrel shotguns, sporting rifles, and a few muskets. Most 
of these were in need of repair. The lack became more pressing and 
worrisome to Maxey as he inspected the Fort Towson, Boggy Depot, and 
Fort Washita installations. He estimated that about two-thirds of 
16 
his conunand were armed, but with very inferior weapons. 
Military logic dictated that these men should either be armed 
or disbanded. However, as military prudence argued that the inade-
quate number of arms in the Trans~Mississippi Department should be 
15 
Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, and Maxey to Kirby-Smith, 
January 15, 1864, ibid., pp. 856-858, 874-877. 
16 
Maxey to Boggs, December 26, 1863, ibid., Vol. XXII, Pt. 2, 
PP• 1112-1113. 
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distributed to the most needed and to the best troops, Maxey felt that 
his. command would probably be last on the list for receiving .firearms. 
Therefore, he based his plea for first consideration in this distri-
bution of arms on promises made to the Indians. He forcefully pointed 
out that the Confederate government had failed to live up to a large 
majority of the treaty stipulations made with the Indians, among which 
was an agreement to supply arms. In these tr~aties the Confederacy 
had agreed to protect the Indians with troops and weapons and pay 
them annuities. Maxey observed that only a handful of white troops 
had been sent, no annuities paid, nor even Indian Commissioners. s • 
. 17 Scott sent to explain. Maxey feared the implications of these 
actions: 
The argtunent used with these people, more potent than 
any other, one that I myself used with them at the outset 
of our difficulties, was that the United States was by 
treaty bound to protect them and had voluntarily fled the 
country, abandoning them to their fate; that it was bound 
by treaty to pay the annuity and had failed, neglected, 
and refused to pay it. Violating the treaty in these. 
essentials, they were absolved from its obligations, and 
left free to act as to them might seem best. Let us beware 
that these potent argtunents are not used against ourselves.18 
He urged Kirby-Smith to send 2,000 firearms as quickly as 
possible in order to demonstrate the Confederacy's good faith and 
bind the Indians' allegiance more closely. "The great trouble~i, '.~ax~y 
complained to his wife, "and the one about which I have more anxiety 
than any other is arms. Oh, for 2,000 good guns, and I would place 
17 
Maxey to Kirby-Smith, February 26, 1864, ibid., XXXIV, Pt. 2, 
p. 996. 
18Ibid. 
Northern Texas in safety. I have the promise, but when will it be 
fulfilled? 1119 Some effort was made in March, 1864, when about 800 
weapons were reportedly sent, a number greatly inadequate to supply 
20 the needs of Maxey's troops. 
21 
As firearms continued to be a major problem; Maxey again tried to 
impress his superiors of this need in July, 1864. He had received 
word indirectly from the Secretary of War through one of his officers, 
Major Campbell LeFlore of the Choctaw Nation, that the Indian Terri-
tory connnand was to receive 3,000 stand of arms. The order, issued 
the preceding F~bruary, had not been fulfilled. Maxey felt that if 
Kirby-Smith would press the matter with President Davis he could ob-
tain the authority and transportation needed to secure the arms. 
He also sought the intervention of Indian Commissioner Scott to 
recommend to the President an Indian plan, endorsed by Maxey, to use 
a reliable ordnance agent to receive the weapons and personally de-
liver them to Indian Territory. This indirect pressure on the Presi-
dent to deliver the firearms as promised resulted in no immediate 
action. As there was little expectation of a direct supply of arms 
from the Trans-Mississippi Department, Maxey hoped these efforts would 
eventually result in compliance to the February order and relieve 
their desperate n,eed for guns. There were some substantial captures 
of weapons from raids made by the Indian brigades, but not enough to 
19 S. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, February 25, 1864, Maxey Papers, 
Gilcrease Institute. 
20Maxey to Kirby-Smith, February 26, 1864, Lee to Maxey, February 
26, 1864, DuBose to Maxey, February 25, 1864, and Cunningham to Maxey, 
March 8, '1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 2, pp. 995-
999, 1030. 
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fully supply his troops, By December, 1864, shortly before Maxey 
left Indian Territory, no action had been taken, and he again re-
minded Kirby-Smith of the need for at least 1,000 good firearms. 
Maxey had tried every means possible to obtain the needed guns for 
his command from his superiors, but was unsuccessful. He was forced 
to rely on captured arms and the variety of old and unserviceable 
weapons his troops had from pre_war _ye_ars. Thus, one of the imperative 
21 
prerequisites for an offensive campaign had evaded Maxey. 
Another serious p.roblem which Maxey encountered was the task of 
supplying his troops with commissary supplies. The condition and its 
cause was obvious to Maxey shortly after his arrival in Indian Terri-
tory. There was a severe shortage of transportation, and all commis-
sary supplies were hauled by wagon from Texas and then distributed. 
"Supplies of breadstuffs and forage, as well as clothing, sugar, &c.,-' 
all having to be drawn from beyond the limits of the Territory," Maxey 
complained to his superiors, "a more than ordinary supply of trans-
portation is necessary. To that for the troops must be added that 
made necessary by the destitute, thrown on the hands of the Government 
22 
who must be taken care of." Only a small quantity could be carried 
in the few wagons available, and cooperation in the acquisition of 
more transportation was not forthcoming. First, Maxey asked that the 
wagons available in Paris, Texas, be placed at his disposal without 
21Maxey to Boggs, July 15, 1864, ibid., Vol. XLI, Pt. 2, p. 1007; 
Maxey to Boggs, October 9, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, pp. 990-991; Maxey to 
Kirby-Smith, December 2, 1864, and December 4, 1864, ibid., Vol. LIII, 
Pt. 1, pp. 1029-1030, 1030-1031. 
22 Maxey to Boggs, May 11, 1864, ibid., Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 3, p. 820. 
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the usual routine delays, but this was refused. Second, he asked head-
quarters to supply him with thirty or forty large ox road wagons, as he 
felt they were the best transportation for the prairie country over 
which they would travel. No wagons were sent. Maxey' s last alterna-
tive was to order his quartermaster to hire or acquire wagons any way 
he could; this procedure proved to b~ the only fruitful means of ob-
taining added transportation. 23 
Maxey was eloquently supported in his request for wagons by 
Colonel E. E. Portlock, Jr., the Assistant Inspector General of the 
District of Indian Territory. Portlock was also alarmed at the tenuous 
supply situation in Indian Territory. "Subject to the will of officers 
whose connections, and consequent interest, are with another district," 
he observed, "our supplies are very precarious and doubtful." Portlock 
concluded: "No one, except from personal observation, can form an 
idea of the utter destitution of the Indian Territory of everything 
except a limited supply of cattle. Every military district in this 
department has internal resources except the Indian Territory. 1124 In 
July, 1864, their supply train consisted of about seventy ox-wagons 
capable of carrying nine days of rations per trip. It took twenty to 
:,:.- ,, 
thirty days for each round trip to Texas to get supplies. The bread-
stuff made in Indian Territory from meal ground in Texas and exposed 
to hot sun for twelve to fifteen days enroute rendered it almost un-
eatable. These facilities were to supply the army and the indigent 
Indians. Therefore, the need for additional transportation was impera-
23Maxey to Kirby-Smith, February 26, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, pp. 994-
997; Maxey to Boggs, May 11, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, pp. 819-820. 
24 Portlock to Maxey, July 8, 1864, ibid., Vol. XLI, Pt. 2, p. 998. 
24 
tive to keep sufficient supplies for the troops to maintain their 
position. If there was to be any hope of an extended military opera-
tion to recapture Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, it was imperative that 
enough wagons be made available to haul quantities of supplies to 
25 sustain troop movements. 
Portlock felt that the security of Indian Territory was of great 
importance to the Trans-Mississippi Department. His report stated: 
Our sole dependence is Northern Texas before whose border 
we stand as a bulwark and defense. If we fail to maintain our 
present position and are forced back to Red River, what becomes 
of Northern Texas? What becomes of the great storehouse of the 
Trans-Mississippi Department? The Indians are devoted to their 
homes and country. Thus far they have exhibited the strongest 
evidences of their loyalty to our cause and cheerful compliance 
with their treaty stipulations; but there is a point where their 
loyalty may stop--when our failure to protect their country may 
force them to seek an alliance which will afford them greater 
immunities than we have ·given. 26 
To avert these dangers and alleviate the situation, Portlock recom-
mended that immediate action be taken. He asked that the regular 
source of supplies be made secure, for at least 100 additional wagons 
to be used to carry provisions to the army, that 60 days of rations be 
stored in a magazine in Indian Territory, and that no meal be sent, as 
it spoiled too easily. Until these recommendations were acted upon, 
Portlock believed that Confederate Trans-Mississippi Headquarters had 
no reason to expect offensive military operations in Indian Territory. 
It was his feeling that "troops badly armed and clothed are not cal-
culated to do great deeds, and when rations fail or are only furnished 
for today, uncertain whether or not tomorrow's supply will come, they 
25Ibid., pp. 997-1000. 
26Ibid., PP• 998-999. 
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are powerless to effect great results." Portlock's report, sub-
mitted to Maxey, was quickly referred to Lieutenant General Kirby-
Smith. Maxey's endorsement of the communication recommended it as 
28 "earnest, very able, satisfactory, and truthful." 
Many other supply problems plagued Maxey. By August, 1864, the 
troops were in. dire need of clothing. His troops, in the field since 
25 
April, 1864, were in need of such basic necessities as shirts, drawers, 
socks, pants, and shoes. Maxey received several letters from appre-
hensive officers who feared insurrection from their ragged and barefoot 
soldiers. The situation made Maxey uneasy, and he appealed to Kirby-
Smith for action. Maxey asked Kirby-Smith to stir up the clothing men 
with a personal request, as the requisitions on staff officers of the 
29 
quartermaster's department did,not obtain the desired results. 
Maxey knew many people in northern Texas, and was able to prevail 
upon the ladie~ to sew clothing for his troops. Major S. A. Blain from 
Sherman, Texas,wrote to Maxey of the efforts of the Sherman ladies: 
There are many garrµfnts now in the hands of the ladies 
being made up. There i~ some already deposited in my office 
ready to send forth. Th~re is at least 140 yards still in 
the looms besides some plain cloth and linsey, and there 
is from 125 to 150 yards now ready for the looms that will 
be put out this week. Add to this 35 or 40 pairs socks al-
ready delivered in my office and it will give you a good 
idea of what may be expected from the ladies of Sherman. 
l must ask you General (on part of the ladies) to be 
patient a short time. Material has been hard to command, 
and difficulties have been met and surmounted that at first 
271bid., p. 999. 
28 
Maxey Endorsement, July 11, 1864, ibid., p. 1000. 
29Maxey to Kirby-Smith, August 18, 1864, ibid., p. 1072; Maxey to 
Kirby-Smith, December 2, 1864, ibid., Vol. 1111, Pt. 1, pp. 1029-1030. 
were not suppose to exist, But we intend to be through in 
time to add something to the comfort of the destitute but 
Gallant Soldiers of your command,30 
Maxey made arrq1.ngements to order shoes through other friends in 
Huntsville and San Antonio. He did not, however, have a great deal 
of faith in any innnediate return on these requests. ~t appeared that 
26 
these sources could provide shoes for the future, but could not help 
with the pres.sing present necessity. Only one unofficial connnunication 
was received from San Antonio, promising to send a newly procured pair 
of French cavalry boots to Maxey and a French calf skin for Mrs. Maxey. 
As in the case of other supplies, Maxey also.relied on captured goods. 
Many of the luxury items were obtained through this source. Various 
raids on the Federals brought in candles, canned fruit, coffee, and 
cloth. 31 
A single satisfactory answer to the problem of supplying Maxey's 
troops was not possible. Because of the important part adequate sup-
plies played in his desire to mount an offensive, his efforts to obtain 
them never ceased. A few weeks before his departure from Indian Terri-
tory he still pleaded for sufficient supplies and money to pay his 
forces. Most of his men were very poor and had not received their 
salary for over a year. They suffere~ along with their families be-
cause of the lack of supplies and bec~use of the depredations connnitted 
30Blain to Maxey, October 18, 1864, Maxey P-apers, Gilcrea,e 
Institute. 
31Maxey to Kirby-Smith, August 18, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XLI, Pt. 2, p. 1072; S. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, Octob~r 12, 
1864, October 19, 1864, and Hester to Maxey, February 1, 1865, Maxey 
Papers, Gilcrease Instit~te. 
32 by stragglers, Maxey was reminded of the desperate situation by 
the principal chief of the Choctaw Nation, Peter P, Pitchlynn: "The 
soldiers who have been engaged in the defense of the country demand 
as a right that their families shall not suffer for bread. Want is 
already rearing its spectral form in some localities •••• Besides 
that, soldiers, regular and irregular, are constantly traversing the 
highways and byways of the nation, taking by force or threats of 
violence the little that is to be found in the sections most desti-
33 
tute. 11 
Maxey agreed with Pitchlynn that the situation was desperately 
in need of relief. He repeated his general order calling for harsh 
handling of stragglers and relayed Pitchlynn's letter to Kirby-Smith 
at headquarters in Shreveport~ Maxey anticipated the help of Kirby-
Smith in ending the drain on their resources created by troops from 
Arkansas. Maxey's final request for help received only the vague 
promise to remove a part of Major General John Bankhead Magruder's 
troops from their location near Indian Territory to relieve the Red 
River area of that drain on supplies, and a general hope that funds 
34 might soon be sent. 
27 
Maxey assumed command in Indian Territory at a time when Confeder-
ate conditions in that location had reached crisis proportions. His 
troops were defeated militarily and emotionally, and were utterly 
32 Maxey to Boggs, December 31, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. LIII, Pt. 1, PP• 1034-1035. 
33Pitchlynn to Maxey, December 29, 1864, ibid., p. 1035. 
34 
Maxey to Boggs, December 31, 1864, ibid.; Belton to Maxey, 
January 6, 1865, ibid., Vol. XLVIII, Pt. 1, p. 1317. 
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demoralized. Their morale was at its lowest ebb and desertions were 
commonplace. Federal forces had defeated them at most encounters for 
an entire year and had pushed them back into the Choctaw Nation and the 
Chickasaw Nation. The Indians had received few of the promises made 
them when they signed their treaties. Arms were almost nonexistent, 
as were supplies and effective leadership. Officers and enlisted men 
had been tornapart by the jealousy and ambition of Cooper in his dis-
pute with Steele. No adequate reorganization or effective mobilization 
of forces had been possible. 
It appeared that Maxey would need to invoke a miracle to bring 
order and success to this chaotic situation. He pitted his intelli-
gence, skill, personality, determination, his knowledge of the geogra-
phy, the needs of the territory, and his fiery enthusiasm against 
chaotic conditions and won a measurable degree of order and success. 
He was able to inspire his troops and give them the high confidence 
in his leadership that they had not found in his predecessors. 
Maxey's evaluation of his administrative and logistic problems was 
made quickly and accurately, and he wasted no time in acting to correct 
existing conditions. He left no doubt that he intended to succeed 
in his duties. 
Maxey's source of energy and conviction was imbedded in his 
sincere belief in the importance of Indian Territory. He considered 
his cormnand to be strategically critical to the success of the entire 
war. All of his actions and measures were directed toward stabilizing 
his cormnand. He felt that a critical factor was the loyalty of his 
Indian troops; if they lost faith in the Confederacy, Indian Terri-
tory would be helpless. He felt that the actions of the white troops 
and their conunanders should be to encourage, support, and help the 
Indian troops in the defense of their homes and area for the ultimate 
benefit of the Confederacy. To this end he attempted troop reorgani-
zation and constantly pleaded for adequate arms and other supplies. 
It was his fear that Indian Territory would be of little use unless 




Maxey's position in Indian Territory included not only the conunand 
of the military forces within its borders, but also the job of Super-
intendent of Indian Affairs. Originally, the superintendency was to be 
filled by an agent from outside the military command. The War Depart-
ment was to select a man suitable to the needs of the indigent popu-
lation; this person would handle certain funds set aside for the 
administration of Indian affairs. The money would be separate from 
the military as would the supplies and equipment of the superintendent. 
Although Indian Territory had been engaged in the war since 1861, no 
one had been appointed to this task when Maxey took command in 
December, 1863. The duties of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs had 
slowly devolved upon the military conunander, and remained a part of 
his duties throughout the war. 1 
It was Maxey's opinion that the superintendency should continue 
.,as a function of his office. The activities of military conunander and 
Indian superintendent had become so intertwined that it would be im-
possible to detach the one from the other, As the two positions would 
very likely furnish the same type of supplies from the same source, 
they would compete against one another if separated. "It would throw 
1 
Maxey to Scott, August 23, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease 
Institute. 
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competition into the ,market of supplies," Maxey emphasized, "and 
raise prices and wind up in collision between contractors and commis-
saries.112 It appeared to Maxey that if the Indian Office made funds 
available, procuring supplies from Texas !or both indigent Indians 
and military troops could be combined to the benefit of all, making a 
separate Superintenqent of Indian Affairs unnecessary. 3 
The duties of the superintendent were only vaguely defined, and 
31 
there were very few precedents for Maxey to follow. Thus, decisions he 
made for future actions were based mainly on observation; he evaluated 
situations and issued orders for reforms that appeared necessary. 
Maxey hoped to succeed in several areas in his capacity as superintend-
ent. First, he was determined to develop a better, more equitable, 
and more reliable. system of caring for the destitute Indians. Second, 
he expected to promote a better relationship between the Indian Office 
and his office to Sijcure more funds on a regular basis. Third, he 
wanted to encourage and rally the sagging confidence of the Indians 
in the Confederacy, and develop spirit and cooperation between the 
tribes and white tro.ops. And finally, he intended to bring organiza-
tion and order to the Indian fighting units. The latter reform was to 
be accomplished by the use of all able-bodied Indians in the service 
~ 4 
under the newly constructed three brigade system. 
3Ibid.; Angie J;)~bo, "Southern Refugees of the Cherokee Nation," 
The Southwestern Hi$torical Quart.erly, Vol. XXXV, No. 4 (April, 1932), 
~257. 
4Maxey to Scott, August 23, 1864, and S. B. Maxey to Marilda 
Maxey, December 29, ~863, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
One of the more pressing situations was the frustrating question 
of feeding and caring for the estimated 15,000 to 16,000 destitute 
Indian refugee population. 5 These people had been pushed further and 
further south until they finally encamped near the Red River, when 
Maxey noted: "Thout,ands of helpless women and children of the 
Cherokee, Creek and Seminole Nations had been driven from their home·s 
32 
by the merciless foe. Their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers were 
in our army. They were driven out many of them in a state of desti-
tution, others nearly so, whilst a few had the means of subsistence 
left. They were homeless wanderers. Apart from the sacred obligations 
of the treaty, it was an act of humanity to provide as best I could 
for these suffering exiled friends and neighbors. 116 
Maxey decided to continue the practice, inaugurated by his prede-
cessors, of feeding the civilian Indians from the military commissariat. 
He felt that, despite misuse of the system by some of the Indians, it 
should be continued: "Although my predecessor who began the system of 
feeding the destitute designed it for those only who were actually 
destitute, I am satisfied that some are there who ought not to be--
yet to enter into strict discrimination in a matter of this sort would 
b . d . 1 · · ,, 7 e unwise an 1mpo 1t1c. However, as the number of refugees grew, 
it became necessary for Maxey to create an extralegal organization to 
5 Scott to Seddon, December 1, 1864, Official Records, Ser,_ i, 
Vol. XLI, Pt. 4, pp. 1086-1090. 
6 
Maxey to Scott, August 23, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease 
Institute. 
8 
administer to the Indian population, 
In January 1864, Maxey created three new offices, although there 
was no law authorizing such appointments. He felt that one of the 
33 
reasons the Indians had suffered so severely during the previous winter 
was because the supplies which were available had not been efficiently 
distributed. In order to facilitate distribution, secure regularity, 
and prevent fraud, Maxey chose several reliable officers to supervise 
and attend to Indian matters. He appointed a Superintendent of Issues 
for the Indians. This officer was to draw subsistence from the mili-
tary commissariat while visiting each nation and tribe to enroll the 
heads of families by name and note the number of women, children, and 
Negroes. He was to use the aid of Indian agents and principal chiefs 
to compile the lists. The roll. was amended each month,. and the com-
pleted document was placed in the post commissary from which t:.he speci.-
fie nae.ion or t:.ribe derived its supplies. He was also to supervise 
other officers, keep records, administer the distribution of rations, 
report:. any frauds against either the Inoians or the commissariat:., and 
see that special rolls were made wnen needed for each nation and 
"b 9 tri e. 
Also created by Maxey was the office of Issuing Agent •. This man 
was appointed by the Indian agent or principal chief of the tribe. 
His duty was to make requisitions for supplies, receive them, and issue 
8Ibid.; Debo, "Southern Refugees of the Cherokee Nation," The 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXXV, p. 257. 
9scott to Seddon, December 1, 1864; Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XLI, Pt. 4, pp. 1086-1090; Maxey to Scott, August 23, 1864,and 
Special Order No. 25, January 31, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrpase 
Institute. 
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them to the proper families. The system called for the Issuing 
Agent to prepare provision tickets, numbered to correspond with the 
rolls, for each head of a family. This ticket contained a listing of 
all provisions issued by date. 'If the provision ticket conformed to 
the rolls which had been placed in the commissary office, the agent 
would issue the proper number of rations. tf the claim did not con-
form to the rolls held by the commissary agent, the ration, as indi-
cated on the official rolls, was distributed and an immediate investi-
gation begun. Each ration was composed of one and one eighth pound of 
flour, or one and one quarter pound of meal, one and one half pound of 
beef, and two quarts of salt to 100 rations. Only those Indians in 
actual want, with no means of self-support, were supposed to request 
government rations, but Maxey felt this should be liberally inter-
preted, as strict interpretation would be injudicious. It was also 
the duty of the Issuing Agent to make quarterly reports to the Super-
intendent of Issues and hire the necessary transportation from the 
Indians for hauling the supplies. They were to be paid at the same 
rate as the Confederate government was paying the citizens of Texas 
and other states for similar transportation of supplies. The third 
office created was that of Inspector of Camps, but details of this 
10 appear not to be known. 
In making his report on the conditions of the Indians to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in August, 1864, Maxey recommended that 
the three new offices created in January be retained. Because their 
10 Maxey to Scott, August 23, 1864, Special Order No. 25, January 
31, 1864, and Act of the General Council of the Choctaw Nation, 
October 31, 1864, ibid. 
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duties had been troublesome cut.well-performed, he asked that their 
occupants be allowed a liberal salary, Admittedly an experiment, 
the system was subject to various revisions and additions as Maxey 
learned more of his corrunand and the Indians. He explained these changes 
to Indian Corrunissioner S. S. Scott, and he recommended that there 
should be at least two other offices created: "I would also recorrunend 
that I be authorized to appoint an enrolling officer whose duty it 
shall be to make an accurate Rolls of Indigent Indians and correct 
them from time to time as occasion requires. This is now done by 
the Superintendent of Issues, and besides burdening him with more than 
one main case load, the two offices in their nature should be separate, 
11 each being a check on the other." The first few months had also 
proven the need for a chief wagon master, with the power to acquire and 
maintain all the transportation necessary for securing and hauling 
supplies to the Indians. 12 
In his report on conditions in Indian Territory, Maxey also men-
tioned the problem of funding the superintendency and paying Indian 
employees: 
There are various employees, some of them are Indians, 
in the Superintendency, for whose pay no funds are in my 
control as Superintendent. I have had no funds turned over 
for the use of the Superintendency. Such as I have been 
called upon to use, I have as District Corrunander ordered 
from my chief Quartermaster. Indians become restless when 
not promptly paid. I would respectfully ask that full 
provision be at once made on the payment of the employees 
and other expenses.13 




Maxey suggested that funds for this purpose be turned over to him and 
received through a bonded agent of the Quartermaster Department whose 
special duty it would be to pay all such claims in Indian Territory. 
Maxey also recommended the enforcement of the regulation that all 
Indian agents be required to reside within the limits of their agency. 
They should, as far as practicable, live in the camps with their 
14 
people. 
Maxey's report was well received by Indian Cormnissioner Scott: 
I regard the Indian Country as being in much better 
condition now and the Indians more hopeful and nearer contented 
than they have been for the last two years. This gratifying 
state or affairs, is to a great extent attributable, I deem 
it proper to say, to the wise and judicious course pursued toward 
them by Major General Maxey. From his report which has just 
been submitted to me, it seems that he well understands Indian 
character, and has ~aken those steps, which were calculated 
to give the people of this District satisfaction.15 
Scott not only praised Maxey's innovative measures, but was 
willing to accept many of his suggestions. The continuance of the 
offices already in existence was endorsed, as well as the new offices. 
Scott also agreed that the agents should, if at all possible, be 
living with the people in their charge. Maxey's suggestion for a 
bonded agent to receive funds was also accepted and acted upon. Robert 
C. Miller was appointed by Lieutenant General Kirby-Smith in August 
for the post in the Quartermaster Department, with instructions to 
disburse the Indian funds as Maxey had requested. Miller was given 
$75,000 to be used in meeting the specified expenses connected with 
the superintendency. No money was to be paid out for these purposes 
14Ibid. 
15 Scott to Kirby-Smith, August 27, 1864, ibid. 
16 without written orders from Maxey. 
In order to fully utilize the Indian troops, Maxey felt it 
necessary to understand and communicate effectively with the various 
tribes. To this end, Maxey had a printing press installed in his 
headquarters at Fort Towson. This press was of great use in reaching 
and influencing the Indians. Maxey included at various times a wide 
diversity of materials. Documents, speeches, laws, special orders, 
and general orders were issued rapidly from the press. All were for 
the purpose of distributing patriotic propaganda to sway, encourage, 
and rally the Indians. He never failed to print documents which 
included complimentary comments about Indian victories. He also 
printed and disbursed addresses made by Indian Commissioner Scott, 
President Davis, and others, and he distributed a number of signifi-
cant acts passed by the tribes in general council. In order to pro-
mote enlistment, Maxey reproduced the reenlistment r~solutions of 
various regiments and tribes. In colorful language he praised their 
devotion and deep loyalty to the Confederate government: 
Imitate the noble example of those glorious troops who 
have battled in defense of their country from the very out-
set, many of whom have never been home since the war began, 
but who, when Congress told them of the urgent necessity of 
re-enlisting for the war, gladly responded, declaring they 
intended to fight it out if it took seventy-five years. 
Imitate their illustrious example. The spirits of such 
people cannot be broken. You have passed the gloomy hour; 
the worst of this revolution is over. Let your name go down 
in history as defenders of the liberty and nationality of 
your race. Enlist for the war.17 
16 Scott to Maxey, October 7, 1864, October 8, 1864, and October 
10, 1864, ibid. 
17Maxey Circular, June 1, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. 
XXXIV, Pt. 4, pp. 640-641. 
37 
38 
Maxey saturated his command area with those publications he felt would 
18 
help raise the morale of his troops. 
Maxey relied to a great extent on his personal appeal to the 
India.ns to reinforce their confiden~e in his ability and the security 
of Confederate strength. He often attended Indian councils and 
traveled many miles to meet with Indian leaders. He observed, soon 
after his arrival in Indian Territory, that the Indians' primary 
decisions were actually made by only a few influential tribal members. 
It was Maxey's desire to reach this aristocracy of leadefship; through 
these men he could contact and control the tribes. His first formal 
encounter with the leaders of the tribes was in the Choctaw Nation at 
the Grand Council of the United N~tions at Armstrong Academy, called 
for February 5, 1864. The meetin~ was for the express purpose of 
establishing peace and friendship with the Plains Tribes to the west 
who were attacking and harassing the Five Civilized Tribes as well 
as Indians in the surrounding states; the council also hoped to 
formalize plans for a raid into Kani;as. Maxey was invited to attend 
and was asked to supply food. He presented a short speech urging 
peace efforts with the Plains Trib~f and promising to supply them 
with trinkets for use in their negotiations. His fiery address was 
well received and even won praise fi:-om Cooper: "Your speech had an 
excellent effect on them [the Ind-i.~q.s]. All are gratified and en-
couraged, especially those who have been forced from their homes, and 
18Maxey tcf Scott, August 23, 186.fi., Maxey Circular, September 29, 
1864, Act of the General Council of the Choctaw Nation, October 31, 
1864, and Special Order No. 25, Januqry 31, 1864, Maxey Papers, 
Gilcrease Institute; Maxey Circular, June 15, 1864, Official Records, 
Ser. i, Vol. XX.XIV, Pt. 4, p. 679; General Order No. 63, October 13, 
1864, ibid., Vol. LUI, Pt. 1, p. 1023. 
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19 hope to drive out the invadors and return to their country." His 
address was requested in printed form by past Chief Moty Kanard of the 
Creek Nation to be read at the council and interpreted fully for all 
assembled. 20 
The impact of Maxey's vigorous attack on the problem of waning 
Indian loyalty was illustrated pointedly at the council meeting. A 
Federal expedition, commanded by Colonel Phillips from Fort Gibson, 
penetrated the Choctaw Nation while the council was in session. The 
invading force foraged widely and intimidated many Indians. Distribu-
ted on the raid were a series of letters written by Phillips to the 
Confederate Indians and their leaders. These messages reiterated the 
amnesty proclamation of President Abraham Lincoln and urged the Creeks, 
Seminoles, Choctaws, and Chickasaws to accept peace and save them-
selves or be destroyed. The Indians discussed the peace offered, de-
feated the isolationist tendencies, and renewed their pledges of 
loyalty to the Confederacy. Maxey's vigor proved to be stimulating, 
and the council was a personal triumph for him. 21 
Maxey missed no opportunities to meet with any Indian tribes. In 
February, 1864, while o~ an inspection tour of the Confederate instal-
lations located at Boggy Depot and Fort Washita, he made a formal 
speech, only to be calle4 on the two following nights to speak in-
formally. "Bass's Regiment marched up after supper and called me out," 
19 Cooper to Maxey, February, 1864, ibid., Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 2, p.959. 
20 Vore to Maxey, January 29, 1864, Maxey to Anderson, February 9, 
1864, and Kanard to Maxey, February 6, 1864, ibid., pp. 928, 958-959, 
960; Abel, The American. Indian as Participant in the Civil War, p. 323. 
21 Ibid.; Maxey to Kirby-Smith, February 26, 1864, Official Records, 
Ser. i, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 2, pp. 994-999; Fred Hood, "Twilight of the 
Confederacy in the Indian Territory," The Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. 
XLI, No. 4 (Winter, 1963-1964), p. 433-. -
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Maxey explained. "I hadn't a hint that anything of the kind was on 
hand till they gave three cheers for me and called me out. Being a 
hair sleepy and in the spirit I gave them a good talk. The next day 
the Creek Warriors assembled and called me out and seemed well 
22 pleased ••• I am satisfied my trip has done great good. 11 In March, 
Maxey addressed a large number of Creeks at B:oggy Depot. He received 
a special invitation to speak to Watie and the Cherokee troops in 
June; the invitation was signed by some of the most prominent Chero-
kees of the time, and expressed their high esteem for Maxey's valuable 
services in Indian Territory. They requested his presence at Camp 
Limestone Prairie for the address, and Maxey readily agreed to go. 
In July he was called upon to speak to the Choctaws assembled in 
23 council at Armstrong Academy. · 
His last important meeting with the Indians was in November, 1864, 
at a gathering of the Grand Council of the United Nations at Armstrong 
Academy. He was asked to deliver a talk on the condition of the Dis-
trict of Indian Territory. He recounted the full history of his civil 
and military administration in a lengthy speech of three hours, basic-
ally an eloquent defense of himself. He felt that he held the entire 
attention of the Grand Council as he discussed the promises and pre-
dictions he had made in his February speech and his successful attempts 
to fulfill them. A resolution was passed endorsing Maxey's entire 
22 S. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, February 25, 1864, Maxey Papers, 
Gilcrease Institute. 
23 
Maxey to Scott, August 23, 1864, S. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, 
February 25, 1864, and Letter from Second Confederate Cherokee Regi-
ment to S. B. Maxey, June 26, 1864, ibid. 
24 administration, both civil and military. 
Through these meetings Maxey came to know and understand the 
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Indians. His relationship with Watie enhanced his concept of the most 
efficient use of the Indian troops; thus, these forces made gains 
through raids and harassment tactics when large field combat could not 
be undertaken. Maxey was able to favorably influence most of the 
Indians, but there were those who would not be swayed from their 
allegiance to Cooper. They were antagonistic and did little to bring 
the union and harmony needed to unite the Indian factions. Cooper 
carefully controlled certain Indian leaders who were working steadily 
and cautiously to undermine Maxey's position. They hoped that by 
maneuvering President Davis through their interpretation of the con-
fused situation, they would be able to make Cooper appear as the logi-
cal commander for Indian Territory. The division among the Indians 
over who should command was deep; the situation was a product of two 
years of Cooper's discontent and manipulation. In the mind of Cooper's 
25 supporters, Maxey was out of place and had to be removed. 
Unanticipated problems grew during Maxey's tenure. One embarras-
sing situation, detrimental to military discipline and morale, festered 
!:: and exploded during Maxey' s command in Indian Territory. Maxey was 
notified by Cooper that an officer, Colonel Charles DeMorse, was 
24s. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, November 6, 1864, and Maxey to 
Kirby-Smith, November 12, 1864, ibid.; Hood, "Twilight of the Con-
federacy in the Indian Territory," The.Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. 
XLI, p. 438. - -
25Hawkins to Folsom, August 13, 1864, Maxey to Scott, August 23, 
1864, Leflore to Ma~ey, June 26, 1864, and Folsom to Scott, December 
26, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute; Maxey to Kirby-Smith, 
November 8, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XLI, Pt. 4, pp. 1035-
103 7. 
questioning the equality of Indians and whites of the same rank. 
DeMorse refused to believe or behave as if Indian officers possessed 
the same ability as white officers. . .He contended that Indians were 
physiologically inferior and that it was "an obvious trait of the 
Indian character that those people are naturally indisposed, as well 
as unfitted, to lead, and of their own impulses always prefer to be 
led, and to repose upon the judgment and superior mental acuteness of 
the white man. 1126 DeMorse felt that, added to the other deprivations 
of the area, such as isolation and lack of advancement, it was an 
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insult to expect white men to be subjected to the military superiority 
of an inferior race. "Our situation," he complained, "is sufficiently 
disagreeable without any unnecessary degredation.11 27 
Cooper answered that there was to be no racial distinction be-
tween whites and Indians. Because this reply was unacceptable to 
DeMorse, the complaintwas forwarded to Maxey. His reply was immediat~ 
and inflexible. The law was positive and definite, he said, and the 
senior officer, regardless of race, commanded the whole: "The Con-
federate Government," Maxey emphasized, "recognizes Indian officers 
without making the slightest distinction between their rights as such 
and white officers. I unhesitatingly decide that the senior officer 
28 
present of any expedition is entitled to the command." DeMorse was 
still unsatisfied, and the correspondence relating to the problem was 
forwarded to the headquarters of the Trans-Mississippi Department for 
26 DeMorse to Cooper, June 29, 1864, ibid., Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 4, 
P• 699 •. 
27Ibid. 
28 Maxey to Cooper, June 29, i864, ibid.j pp. 698-699. 
further attention. 29 No decision was communicated to Maxey. 
There were other incidents of poor Indian-white relations to 
plague Maxey. Complaints from the white troops that the Indian force 
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failed to do their part in battle were made to.him: "That there is not 
the confidence and reliance placed in the Indian troops by the whites 
that there ought to be to give strength •••• And the whites just after 
a fight feeling that others have not done their part and their wit-
nessing them make assaults on wounded prisoners, are so apt to become 
enraged and threaten violence. 1130 Maxey's reaction was one of patience 
and understanding, for he fully comprehended the circumstances and con-
ditions that would propagate such charges. He had learned a great 
deal about Indians and thoroughly appreciated their abilities and 
understood their weaknesses. He realized that the use of Indian 
troops was an important pa;rt of Indian Territory's military policy. 
He admired many of the Indian leaders and remarked that he wished more 
of his white officers had Watie's energy. The rise of prejudice 
against the Indian forces under existing conditions was not surprising; 
nor was the fact that there was no complete answer to satisfy his 
h f I d . h" . 31 troops, t ere ugee n ians, or is conscience. 
Maxey's leadership within Indian Territory had substantial ef-
fects. He could justifiably claim by the end of 1864 that he had been 
successful. He made every effort to influence, encourage, and cheer 
the Indians, and he had been able to rally them. He had no peer in 
291bid.; DeMorse to Cooper, June 29, 1864, ibid., PP• 699-700. 
30 Gano to Maxey, August 20, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease 
Institute. 
31Ibid.; Maxey to Anderson, February 7, 1864, Official Records, 
Ser. i, Vol. LIII, pp. 963-966. 
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propaganda work. His printing press had inundated the area with 
well-chosen messages of hope and success; his fiery speeches delivered 
at a variety of places were vivid, inspiring, and stimulating. After 
only a few months, his vigor and ability had restored a degree of the 
Indians' faith in the Confederacy. His rulings and reforms were 
necessary, effective, impartial, and manifested no prejudice against 
the Indians. His interpretation of the office of Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs and its combination with the military command resulted 
in more efficient procurement and distribution of supplies. His 
innovative formation of offices qnd duties were necessary and desirable 
measures in his system of caring· for the destitute refugees. He was 
instrumental in obtaining the necessary funds for the pressing expenses 
of the Indian agents. Despite the undermining efforts of Cooper, 
Maxey continued to sway, stimulate, and influence the Indians. If 
it had not been for his skill and enthusiasm, the Civil War for the 
Confederate Indians could very well have ended in early 1864. 
CHAPTER IV 
MILITARY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 
Military planning and operations during 1864 in Indian Territory 
occupied much of Maxey's time and effort. This activity was confined 
primarily to routine matters such as the acquisition of accurate scout-
ing reports, personnel problems, troop movements, military courts, and 
prisoner exchange efforts. There was no major battle action in Indian 
Territory during Maxey's tenure. He was personally involved in only 
one battle while commanding in Indian Territory, and this was in 
Arkansas at Poison Spring in April, 1864. His troops, however, ex-
perienced a variety of combat action, including not only activity in 
Arkansas, but harassment attacks around Fort Smith, a raid on a haying 
camp, and the capture of a supply ship and train. 
Shortly after arriving in Indian !erritory, Maxey assessed the 
situation and drew several conclusions about existing conditions and 
possibilities for aggressive military action: "The true defense of 
this Territory, and consequently of Northern Texas, was north of the 
Arkansas River. The supplies," Haxey informed his superiors, ''from 
the fertile valleys of that river and its tributaries would have been 
abundant for all purposes." He felt that the Federals should never 
have been permitted to occupy Fort Smith and Fort Gibson or to have 
taken possession of Waldron, Arkansas, forty-five miles southwest of 
Fort Smith: "The first thing that ought to be done," Maxey emphasized, 
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"and speedily, i~ to drive the enemy out of Waldron back to Fort 
Smith, and compel him to conunence there next Spring .... In my 
opinion ••• [our] force ought not to open the spring campaign on Red 
River. It should be concentrated and moved to the front as far as 
practicable •••• If possible we should take the initiative in the 
1 spring campaign." 
The need for such aggressive activity was· not doubted by Maxey: 
"The wonderful importance of so strengthening this army as to enable 
it to regain Fort Smith and Fort Gibson and to expel the enemy from 
this territory has never been realized by those not conversant with 
the geography of this country, its bearing on Northern Texas, and the 
absolute necessity of the grain, beef, salt, and iron of that country 
2 on the Trans-Mississippi Department." The probability of the Con-
federates in Indian Territory being able to take offensive action in 
the spring of 1864 depended on the efforts of Maxey to acquire the 
necessary equipment and to infuse the proper spirit into his troops. 
All of Maxey's effort to supply and maintain his troops, all of his 
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support activity to other areas, all of his energy, his drive, and his 
hopes were oriented toward the recovery of Indian 1erritory for the 
security of northern Texas and the continued use of all Confederate 
troops. These idea_s were formed early in hi-s connnand and were to 
endure and dominate his military thinking throughout his tenure in 
Indian Territory. 
Military plans made by Maxey were greatly affected by his close 
1 Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 2, P• 857. 
2Ibid., P• 858. 
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proximity to Arkansas. His relationship to that area and its com-
manders altered his projects for action on two occasions. The first 
was in early March, 1864, when he received word of an expected Federal 
offensive in Arkansas. Federal troop movement had been reported first 
to Maxey about March 8, and on March 12 he was ordered to "move all 
your available force, except such Indian troops as you may think it 
absolutely necessary to leave on the frontier, to some point in the 
southeastern part of your district near Laynesport [Arkansas] •••• 
Here they will be held in readiness to be drawn upon so that they may 
be sent to support G'eheral Holmes. 113 Maxey, however, was hesitant. 
He wrote Lieutenant General Kirby-Smith that he had several reserva-
tions about the proposed use of his troops. He feared the concentra-
tion of his entire white force in one location so far removed from the 
center of Indian Territory military operations. He knew that the 
Federals would be reinforcing Fort Smith and Fort Gibson, which left 
his command area subject to devastation by cavalry raids. Also, his 
poorly equipped and inadequately mounted force was unable to move 
rapidly enough to slow or stop Federal encroachments. 4 
Maxey reported that his one full brigade of white troops under 
Colonel Richard M. Gano would be available immediately, but the 
others, a force of about 500 scattered over the area, would be better 
left to defend Indian Territory. The Choctaw brigade, commanded by 
Colonel Tandy Walker and considered by Maxey his best Indian troop unit, 
was available but could not leave Indian Territory to fight unless it 
3cunningham to Maxey, March 12, 1864, ibid., p. 1039. 
4Maxey to Kirby-Smith, March 16; 1864, ibid., p. 1050. 
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willingly agreed to do so. Treaty stipulations did not require Indian 
forces to go outside Indian Territory to fight. Maxey also recommended 
to Kirby-Smith that Colonel Watie's brigade would "do far better cut 
5 loose to operate in the rear ••• than with any army." Kirby-Smith 
expected Maxey to cooperate in the Arkansas campaign, but he assured 
him that he should use his own judgment as to the number of men he con-
centrated at Laynesport, Arkansas, and the number he left behind for 
6 the defense of Indian Territory. 
Maxey was ordered to place his command in readiness to move t6 
the crossings of the Red River in the vicinity of Fulton, Arkansas, to 
cover the line of retreat of Major General Sterling Price, Holmes' 
successor in Arkansas, on March 16, 1864. As the orders to prepare 
for movement became more defin:Lte and specific, Maxey still appeared 
reluctant. It was his thought that for the best interest of Indian 
Territory his troops should not be used fo:r the purpose for which they 
were requested. He felt that their movement into Arkansas would be an 
abandonment of Indian Territory. He reasoned that it was of great 
importance to the Confederacy and Indian Territory that his forces 
should be used in campaigns against the Federals at Fort Smith and Fort 
Gibson to prevent possible overwhelming movements from those locations. 
It was also obvious to Maxey that his troops would be in a much better 
position to take advantage of successful Confederate activity in 
5Ibid. 
6cunningham to Maxey, March 8, 1864, Maxey to Kirby-Smith, March 
16, 1864, and Cunningham to Maxey, March 21, 1864, ibid., pp. 1031, 
1049-1050, 1067-1068. 
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Arkansas to recapture Fort Smith and Fort Gibson. 7 
However anxious Maxey was to convince his superiors of his point 
of view, he continued to make preparations and gather his troops for 
support action in Arkansas. As the size of the effort grew, there be-
gan to appear to Maxey the possibility fbr an extended military opera-
tion. He hoped that the momentum of the campaign would carry Confeder-
ate victory through all of western Arkansas and into Indian Territory. 
He communicated his suggestions to his commanding officer, Lieutenant 
General Kirby-Smith: 8 
Our cavalry, in my opinion, is altogether too prudent. 
The whole campaign should be a bold one. As many troops as 
can be thrown together and maintained should be, and you 
ought to take them in hand yourself. I believe no man on this 
side could effect so much. It does seem to me that if we 
could recover Fort Smith, and of course, Fort Gibson, and main-
tain troops that high up, that a small cavalry force ener-
getically managed could effect a great deal on their lines of 
communication, gathering recruits, stragglers, &c., and in 
smashing up this miserable Yankee attempt to erect a State 
government in Arkansas, besides the moral effect produced 
by regaining the whole of this Territory and Western 
Arkansas. 9 
On March 31, the order was given for Maxey to move his troops to 
combine with Major General Price, or if too late, to cover the Red 
River crossings in front of Washington, Arkansas, which appeared to 
be threatened by attack. By the time word reached him, Maxey was 
too late to meet Price, but Maxey at once ordered Brigadier General 
Gano to send every available man to Washington. Maxey regretted that 
7cunningham to Maxey, March 20, 1864, and Maxey to Anderson, 
March 22, 1864, ibid., pp. 1062, 1070-1071. 
8 Maxey to Anderson, March 22, 1864, and Maxey to Kirby-Smith, 
March 26, 1864, ibid., pp. 1070-1071, 1085-1086. 
9Ibid., P• 1086. 
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Gano's force was weak, and he explained to Kirby-Smith that he had 
sent 500 of Gano's men to Roseville, Arkansas, to destroy all Feder-
al "cotton and comissary stores and the grounded boats, producing as 
much consternation by a movement of this kind in the rear as possible. 
As soon, however, as I received your order, I directed Gano to recall 
10 
Colonel Battle, sending him to Washington." Maxey also ordered 
Walker's brigade to Laynesport with the possibility of taking it into 
Arkansas if the Indians were willing to go. Maxey anticipated no diffi-
culty in persuading them and expected good results, but the option to 
refuse was still theirs. All other troops, none of which were white, 
11 
were too far away and too scattered to be called. 
Maxey arrived at Laynesport in early April with Gano's brigade; 
Walker's brigade was expected soon, but he had not started promptly 
and was moving slowly. Maxey could make no other moves until his 
orders were clarified. He had become confused by a succession of 
contradictory connnunications. "The tenor of General Smith's instruc-
tions indicates that he expected my attention to be turned mainly to 
the crossing of Red River. I am, however, ordered (by General Bogg's 
letter)," Maxey explained," to report for instructions to General 
Price. General Price directs everything to be moved to Washington 
12 
that I can spare as rapidly as possible." As Maxey waited for.a 
more specific order, doubts began to assail him: 
10 Maxey to Kirby-Smith, April 3, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, p. 729. 
11rbid., pp. 728-729; Cunningham to Maxey, March 31, 1864, ibid., 
Pt. 2, p. llO.l. 
12 Maxey to Boggs, April 7, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, p. 745. 
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i shall spare no pains to render all the assistance in my 
power, yet I feel in an awkward position. All the force I can 
send amounts to no great deal. I am of course thrown out of my 
district and cannot tell so well what is going on. These reasons, 
however, would be insufficient •••• If I could take a respectable 
force, then I would feel that I was not an interloper, but I 
think it most likely that the sending of any one at this late 
hour to rank those now around Washington would produce confusion 
and perhaps hard feelings. I have no ambition to gratify and no 
wish outside of my duty.13 
Maxey desired to clarify his position before he was placed in an unten-
able situation: 
I am at a loss to know what is expected of me •••• 
Unless there is some specific duty for me to perform in 
Arkansas, I would respectfully suggest that, as there is 
an abundance of generals and a scarcity of troops fbout 
Washington, I could do more good in my own district 
than there, unless I have specific orders, leaving no 
room for doubt or dispute as to the position I am to 
occupy. No officer likes to have another put over him 
on the eve of battle, and no ranking officer likes to be 
kept where a fight is anticipated without exercising the 
rights of rank. The labor I care nothing for. I can do 
as much of th.at and as cheerfully as most men, but I do 
not like a doubtful position.14 
Kirby-Smith I s headquarters tried to reassure Maxey and explain the 
entire situation. Maxey was told that Kirby-Smith's intention was n·ot 
"to remove you from your district, where he considers. your services 
indispensable, and where you have discharged your duties so much to 
his satisfaction. 1115 As soon as he felt he could feasibly do so, 
Maxey was to return to the immediate command of his district. However, 
"if you thought you had left the administration of your district in 
good hands and could render more efficient service where you are, you 
13 Ibid. 
141bid., PP• 745-746. 
15 Boggs to Maxey, April 12, 1864, ibid., p. 760. 
are at liberty to remain until such time as you think best, and that 
16 you would be entitled to a command in accordance with your rank." 
Kirby-Smith also attempted to explain his long-range strategy to 
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Maxey. He hoped to keep the Federal advance contained with the troops 
then in Arkansas until sufficient reinforcements could arrive to defeat 
the advancing Union troops and, if at all possible, to move forward 
toward the Arkansas River area. It was to be a large scale effort. 
This plan readily met with Maxey's approval: "I am glad to know the 
general has adopted the campaign chalked out in your letter," he wrote. 
"I think any man who understands his profession w;i.11 fully endorse .. 
it. 1117 If this was to be a full-scale movement into Arkansas, Maxey 
would not have to rely so heavily on his inadequately armed and 
equipped forces. Once this campaign was underway, his forces could 
leave their position near Washington, Arkansas, and move northward 
through Indian Territory toward Fort Smith and Fort Gibson. 18 With 
these reassurances, Maxey felt a great deal more favorable about the 
campaign's future and his desire to participate in the effort: 
I am very much gratified to know that my administration 
in the Indian Territory has met the approbation of the general 
commanding. No man ever worked harder. or with a more diffi-
cult task •••• I left General Cooper in command, who will 
attend to the district to your satisfaction during my ab-
sence •••• I have two brigades here. I do not believe they 
can well spare me. Besides, while others are. getting honors 
conferred, I confess to a weakness that way, and I think 
I could work myself to a skeleton in the district and not do 
so much in that way as in a single day with opportunity in 
the field. I shall, however, return to the district with the 
16Ibid., P• 761. 
17 Maxey to Boggs, April 14, 1864, ibid., p. 765. 
18Ibid.; Boggs to Maxey, April 12, 1864, ibid., PP• 760-761. 
troops I brought whenever in the opinion of the commander 
of the forces here we can be spared. I would leave without 
them whenever I thought I could be spared were it not that 
I know they need me, and that I know a man not unfrequently 
loses his troops by getting them too far away.19 
Meanwhile, Watie's comrnand was working its way north toward Fort 
Smith and Fort Gibson. This force was expected to harass and torment 
these Federal posts and cause as much consternation as possible. 
Cooper, left to command Indian Territory, continued to urge Maxey to 
return as quickly as possible from Laynesport as they all feared an 
attack of some kind. It was Cooper's desire to make a show of force 
to hold the Federals in check in Indian Territory. 20 
By April 12, 1864, Maxey had moved into Arkansas to a point 
53 
eight miles northeast of Washington with Gano's brigade anq was joined 
there on April 13 by Walker's brigade of Indians. The Federal attack-
ing force in Arkansas was under the leadership of Major General 
Frederick Steele. Steele's intention was to march to Shreveport, 
Louisiana, the Trans-Mississippi Confederate headquarters, by way of 
Camden, Arkansas. By using a deceptive ruse and feigning a line of 
movement toward Washington, he deceived the Confederates awaiting him 
outside Washington at Prairie de 1Ane, where Maxey•s forces partici-
pated in a minor engagement. Price ordered Maxey•s Indians to help 
in an attack on the Union's rear guard when the Federal line of march 
changed from a southern movement to an eastward dash to Camden, but 
after initial success, the Confederates were thrust back. There was 
a severe cannonade in which Maxey's Indians troops acquitted themselves 
19 Maxey to Boggs, April 14, 1864, ibid., p. 765. 
201bid.; Scott to Maxey, April 12, 1864, ibid., pp. 762-763. 
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well; they had not broken fonnation or withdrawn until ordered to do so 
while withstanding the withering barrage. Steele entered Camden un-
opposed on April 15. 21 
A few days later, on April. 18, Maxey's troops were again involved 
in combat action, this time in a more significant attack on a supply 
train. A series of circumstances, including colliding supply ships 
and scarceness of forage due to Confederate destruction of crops and 
mills, forced Steele to rely heavily on a cache of corn discovered near 
Poison Spring, just west of Camden. On April 17, a forage wagon train 
was sent to bring in these supplies. The expedition was led by 
Colonel James M. Williams and consisted of approximately 200 wagons; 
the First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry, consisting of 438 men; 
the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, the Second Kansas Cavalry, and the Four-
teenth Kansas Cavalry, composed of 195 troopers; and 33 artillerists 
of the Second Indiana Battery, with 2 howitzers. The total number was 
about 670 men, more than half of whom were Negro. The train made its 
way unimpeded to the source of supply, located the forage, loaded the 
wagons, and headed back to Camden. As they journeyed homeward, they 
continued to gather grain along the way. Two miles from Poison Spring 
• 
the train was re-.enforced by the Eighteenth Iowa Volunteer Inf~ntry·, 96 
men from 3 cavalry units, and 25 artillerists, for a tot;i of 504 men 
plus 2 more howitzers. The conunand included approximately 1,170 men 
21 Maxey to Anderson, April 12, 1864, ibid., pp. 761-762; LeRoy H. 
Fischer and Jerry Gill, "Confederate Indian Forces Outside of Indian 
Territory," The Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XLVI, No. 3 (Autumn, 
1968), pp. 272-274. 
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as it approached Poison Spring. 22 
Major General Price had established headquarters sixteen miles 
west of Camden at Woodlawn. His force included approximately 6,000 
men composed of 7 cavalry brigades, of which 2 were Maxey 1 s. They had 
the road west out of Camden well guarded and observed. The route of 
the train was discovered by Colonel Colton Greene's brigade of Briga-
dier General Johns. Marmaduke's division. The activity of the forage 
train was quickly reported and Major General Price was informed. Price 
dispatched a force under Marmaduke to intercept the forage train. 
The total group consisted of not only Marmaduke's troopers but also the 
brigades of Colonel William Crawford, 300 men; Brigadier General William 
L. Cabell, l,200 men; Colonel Greene, 500 men; and Maxey, 1,335 men. 
The units had all arrived at Lee's farm on the Camden Road between 
Steele and the forage train by 9:00 a.m. on April 18, 1864. 23 
As Maxey was the ranking officer at Poison Spring, Brigadier 
General Marmaduke inunediately tendered his conunand to Maxey. Marmaduke 
reported: "As Maxey was my senior in rank I reported to him for 
orders. He replied that as I had put on foot the expedition and knew 
the position of affairs I would make the disposition of the troops and 
the fight. 1124 The two officers and Brigadier General Cabell conferred 
22Ira Don Richards, "The Battle of Poison Spring," The Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (Winter, 1959), pp. 337-343; 
Wiley Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War (Kansas City: 
Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, 1922), pp. 360-363. 
23Richards, "The Battle of Poison Spring," The Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, pp. 341-343; Report of Brigadier General Marma-




in their effort to deploy the troops and, although Maxey was in 
general command of the entire operation, he ordered Marmaduke to com-
plete the actual plans for action. The officers placed their men to 
intercept the train, which was located on high ground moving in an 
east-west direction. Marmaduke's division was placed on the right, 
blocking the road east to Camden. Crawford's men were placed on the 
right: of the Confederate position, while Cabell' s troops were in the 
center stretched across the road and to the left. Maxey's division 
was on the left near the far west end of the forage train. The 
farthest west was Walker's Indian. brigade, then a battery of artillery 
commanded by Captain William B. Krumbhaar, followed by Gano' s brigade 
under the command of Colonel Charles DeMorse, which met Cabell's 
battery of artillery to complete the deployment. One mounted brigade 
under Greene was held in reserve. When the troops were in place, 
25 pickets were sent forward to warn of the Federal approach. 
The plan of attack, according to Maxey, was to move his division 
forward, "the right of it passing sufficiently to the left of the old 
field south of the road to be concealed, the left to be moved forward 
so as to bring that division fronting the enemy, and to bring on the 
fight with that division, and to throw Cabell's division forward 
through the field into the fight so soon as Maxey's division became 
well engaged, and to move the forces on the right well forward, covering 
2\bid.; Report of Brigadier General Maxey, April 23, 1864, ibid., 
p. 841; Richards, "The Battle of Poison Spring," The Arkansas Histori-
cal Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, p. 343; Fischer and Gill, "Confederate 
Indian Forces Outside of Indian Territory," The Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
Vol. XLVI, p. 274. 
57 
26 
the road." The Federal troops met the Confederate pickets a mile 
before the concealed ambush was encountered. The Confederate pickets 
were pushed back easily until they approached Lee's plantation and the 
battle area. Resistance stiffened and Williams caught sight of the 
Confederate line blocking the road. Being unaware of Maxey's con-
cealed troops, Colonel Williams was at first not cognizant of the full 
danger. Maxey had hoped to surprise the Federals, but Colonel Williams 
became aware of the presence of troops on his right flank and was able 
to turn four companies of the First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry 
. h d. . d ff h b f f · 2 7 int at irection an o er a eavy arrage o gun ire. 
With this activity at 10:00 a.m. on April 18, the actual battle 
commenced. Maxey ordered his division at once into motion, and he 
reported that they 
moved as steadily as possible considering the difficulties 
presented by broken ground and dense undergrowth. Hughey's 
battery was set to work to attract attention from this move-
ment. The division was delayed half an hour longer from 
engagement than I anticipated, owing to the nature of the 
ground. Desultory firing had been going on for some time, 
followed by very heavy firing, and learning that, the enemy 
was pressing hard upon Gano's brigade, right of Maxey's 
division, I threw Greene's brigade of Missourians, of Marma-
duke's command, to its relief. This brigade went gallantly 
and with a will to its work. It arrived on the right of 
Gano's brigade just as the engagement on that part of the 
line became heavy and general, apart of the enemy's line 
having fallen back. Hot work was going on all along the line 
from the right of Greene's to the left of the Choctaw brigade, 
the extreme left of the line. One continued shout was heard, 
and an unfaltering advance of all that part of the line. Ca-
bell's division was immediately ordered forward, going in 
splendidly, charging in double-quick over the open field 
26Report of Brigadier General Maxey, April 23, 1864, Official 
Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 1, p. 841. 
27Richards, "The Battle of Poison Spring," The Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, pp. 346~347; Fischer and Gill, "Confederate 
Indian Forces Outside of Indian Territory,"~ Chronicles of Okla-
homa~ Vol. XLVI, PP• 274-275. 
into .the fight. The fight was now general all along the 
line, our men pressing forward and the enemy giving back 
everywhere.28 
The road was gained, and the train was taken. The Federals withdrew, 
abandoning the train and a battery of four artillery pieces. 
The battle over, Maxey assumed full command, but his decisions 
were then opposed by Marmaduke. It was Maxey's desire to secure the 
train, the object of the battle, as quickly as possible. It was 
58 
Marmaduke's wish to pursue the fleeing Federals. The troops, including 
the Choctaws under Walker, had chased the routed Federal troops for 
two miles. Marmaduke ordered a full scale pursuit, but Maxey counter-
mantled Marmaduke and ordered the forage train guarded and made ready 
to move toward Woodlawn and safety as quickly as possible. Maxey 
secured the train by placing Gabel+ up the road toward Camden, putting 
Marmaduke in the rear, moving his own division in front of the train, 
and requesting Brigadier General James Fagan's brigade and Gano's 
brigade to hold the middle Camden road. The entire train was in head-
quarters at Woodlawn by midnight on April 18. Thirty wagons were 
burned, but 170 with teams were saved along with the artillery. There 
were few casualties in Maxey's division, with but 17 killed, 88 
wounded, and 10 missing; Federal casualties numbered 700 killed, 
d d d . . 29 woun e, an m1.ss1.ng. 
Maxey and the other Confederate officers were lavish in their 
28Report of Brigadier General Maxey, April 23, 1864, Official 
Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXXIV, Pt.· 1, pp. 841-842. 
29Ibid., pp. 841-844; Report of Brigadier General Marmaduke, 
April 21, 1864, ibid., p. 826; Fischer and Gill, "Confederate Indian 
Forces Outside of Indian Territory," The Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
Vol. XLVI, P• 275. 
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praise of the troops. "I can only say," Maxey reported, "so far as my 
observation extended every officer and man did his whole duty. The 
plan of battle was in every particular carried out The whole· l':ine 
moved forward like a sheet of living fire, carrying death and destruc-
tion before it •••• I beg leave to call special attention to the Choe-
taw brigade. These people came of their own volition. No law or 
treaty compelled them to do so •••• Nobly, gaUantly, gloriously they 
30 did their duty." Marmaduke commented that 11,General Maxey' s force was 
excellent, bearing as it did the earliest fire of the confident 
31 
enemy." Price commended Maxey in his analysis of the action at 
Poison Spring: "I beg leave to acknowledge the prompt and effective 
support rendered me by Brigadier-General Maxey and his troops. Leav-
ing the District of the Indian Territory, which he commanded, he joined 
me at a time when the necessity for re-enforcements seemed greatest, 
and until relieved from duty here after the evacuation of Camden by the 
Federal forces continued to perform most efficient service. 1132 
Maxey and his troops were relieved from duty in Arkansas and 
ordered to return to Indian Territory on April 28, 1864. At that time 
he was commended by Kirby-Smith for his valuable service and gallantry 
while in Arkansas. "I can now more confidently than ever rely upon 
your ability," Kirby-Smith emphasized, "and the brave troops under your 
command to repel any threatened invasion of your district. 1133 Maxey 
30Report of Brigadier General Maxey, April 23, 1864, Official 
Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 1, PP• 842-843. 
31 Report of Brigadier General Marmaduke, April 21, 1864, ibid., 
p. 826. 
32 Report of Major General Price, May, 1864, ibid., p. 783. 
33williamson to Maxey, April 28, 1864, ibid., p. 845. 
wasted no time after his return to issue a general order announcing 
his unqualified approval of the conduct of the division he had com-
mantled in the recent campaign in Arkansas: 
Your action has been glorious. You have made yourselves 
a name in history. While the enemy's columns are seeking 
safety in flight let us not lie supinely and spend our time 
in idle rejoicings. We have now work in our own territory 
to do. Let us buckle on our armor and be ready at all times--
and at any moment to move in full force, day or night, ready 
and willing and fully able to drive every foe from the 
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country it is our special duty to defend and protect. Hard-
ships we have already endured. We can do so again. If we 
cannot go as well prepared as we would like, let us go un-
complaining!! with what we have. I call upon all to come up 
to the work. 4 
Maxey also issued a general order expressing his satisfaction with 
Cooper's administration of Indian Territory during his absence. 35 
Maxey had been back in Indian Territory only a short time before 
he began to look for the prospects of military activity which he had 
earlier anticipated as part of the overall Arkansas campaign. Accord-
ing to his interpretation of Kirby-Smith's remarks at the beginning of 
the movement in Arkansas, Maxey could expect an offensive against all 
Federal forces in the Arkansas valley. Maxey hoped that the Confederate 
troops would now move swiftly against the Federals at Little Rock so 
that he could move his troops toward Fort Smith. He felt the fort 
could be recaptured, but not held, unless the river below was in Con-
federate possession. He urged Confederate Trans-Mississippi head-
quarters to keep him informed of any movement in his direction~ No 
such action was indicated, but Maxey was informed by Kirby-Smith's 
chief of staff, Brigadier General w. R. Boggs, that the ~urse of 
34General Order No. 38, May 9, 1864, ibid., PP• 844-845. 
35General Order No. 39, May 9, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, p. 816. 
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action originally structured was still anticipated.36 
As soon as the Red River valley was cleared of Federal troops, 
preparations could be made for an active campaign in the Arkansas 
valley. Maxey was ordered to hold his command prepared to cooperate 
with any movement in that area. Maxey was hopeful and quickly moved 
Gano's and Walker's brigades to Johnson's Station, a point about 100 
miles from both Fort Smith and Fort Gibson. Maxey wrote Major General 
Price to inform him of their position and remind him that the posses-
sion of a strategic point, such as Little Rock, by the Confederates 
was imperative to any permanent possession on the upper Arkansas 
valley. There was, however, no call made on Maxey and no movement of 
the Confederates in Arkansas. Maxey's troops settled in the vicinity 
of Fort Smith waiting for the summons that did not 
37 come. 
Although Maxey hoped for support to recapture all of Indian Terri-
tory, it was his intention in the meantime to discourage and demoralize 
the Federal troops at Fort Smith and Fort Gibson at every opportunity. 
It ~as Cooper's task to make it so unpleasant for these forces with 
harassment and worrisome attacks on supply lines that these troops 
would be forced from the area. Throughout the summer and early fall 
of 1864 raids and skirmishes were oriented toward these goals. Haste 
was important to Maxey, as he felt time would only strengthen the 
Federal position. He encouraged his officers in their ideas and plans 
for such operations, especially north of the Arkansas River. These 
36 Maxey to Boggs, May 11, 1864, May 15, 1864, and May 19, 1864, 
ibid., pp. 819-820, 826, 830-831. 
37May 19, 1864, ibid., pp. 830-831; Maxey to Price, May 31, 1864, 
ibid., Vol. XLI, Pt. 2, PP• 1008-1009. 
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actions would also have the added effect of encouraging the. Confeder-
ate Indians, for any success would lend hope to the dream of regaining 
their lost homes. 38 
The use of Confederate Indian troops in harassment campaigns and 
raids proved to be effective and profitable. The first successful 
raid was made by Colonel Watie, whom Maxey had recently recomnended 
for promotion to brigadier general, on the steamship J. R. Williams. - - . 
The Federals attempted to supply Fort Gibson from Fort Smith up the 
Arkansas River by sending an inadequately protected steamship loaded 
with $120,000 worth of flour, bacon, sugar, shoes, yarn, blankets, 
and other badly needed comnissary items. Watie and his men discovered 
the mission of the ship and planned an ambush near Pleasant Bluff, 
twenty miles above Fort Smith. On June 15, 1864, the~· R. Williams 
was attacked and captured without difficulty. Watie was unable to 
stop the Creeks and Seminoles of his command from gathering all the 
supplies they could carry and hurrying t.o theiX" destitute families. 
Watie was left with so few men that he was not able to hold the ship 
against a Federal relief force and the ship and remaining supplies 
were burned as the Confederates retreated. Although the Indians 
could not remove the bulk of the supplies, the destruction of the 
goods prevented their use by the Federals at Fort Gibson. The attack 
discouJ:"aged the Federal forces from again using the water route:for 
38Maxey to Kirby-Smith, August 18, 1864, 'ibid., p. 1072; Fischer 
and Gill, "Confederate Indian Forces Outside of Indian Territory," 
The Chronicles of Oklahoma,. Vol. XLVI, pp. 278-279 • 
• 
39 resupply. 
In the same general military effort, Cooper's troops made two 
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successful attempts to threaten Fort Smith in July, 1864. On July 27, 
at 6:00 a.m., a detachment of about 600 men under the cormnand of Briga-
dier General Gano, including Indians under Lieutenant Colonel Simpson 
N. Folsom and Lieutenant Colonel Jackson McCurtin, completely surprised 
an outpost battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry Regiment five miles 
outside of Fort Smith. The Federals were completely routed, with 50 
men killed and wounded and 127 captured. Also taken were 200 Sharps 
rifles, about 400 six-shooters, and a number of horses and much camp 
equipment. Maxey was very pleased with the success of the mission 
and commended his officers and men: "In brilliancy and dash and 
completeness of success it has not been surpassed in this year of 
b ·11· . . 1140 ri iant victories. Encouraged by their success, another demon-
stration was made toward Fort Smith on July 31, this time with the 
added force of Brigadier General Watie. The troops engaged in a picket 
fight outside of Fort Smith. The Confederates were able to drive the 
Federals back to their fortifications, but darkness forced the with-
drawal of the Confederates and the siege ended. Little of material 
39Ibid., p. 279; Maxey to Scott, August 23, 1864, Maxey Papers, 
Gilcrease Institute; Watie to Maxey, June 17, 1864, ibid.; Maxey to 
Boggs, June 20, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 4, 
p. 686; Worten Manson Hathaway,."Brigadier General Stand Watie, Con-
federate Guerrilla" (Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, Oklahom~ 
State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1966), pp. 71-73; Rampp, "The __ 
Twilight 0 of the Confederacy in Indian Territory, 1863-1865," pp, 89-96; 
James D. Morrison, "Capture of the J. R. Williams, June 15, 1864,11 · The 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XLII, No.-2 (Summer, 1964), pp. 107-108. 
~ . 
General Order No. 53, July 29, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i; 
Vol. XLI, Pt. 1, p. 30. 
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substance was gained by the Confederate forces, as they captured only 
a few horses and some cattle. Two of Watie's troops were killed, 
twelve Federals were captured, and their camp and commissary goods 
were burned. Maxey described his troops as behaving gallantly, but 
· h 1 · · d bl · 41 wit imite measura e gain. 
Further activity was delayed until August 24, 1864, when at 
Gunter's Prairie, southwest of Fort Smith, Watie attacked a Federal 
haying party. He crossed the Arkansas River with 500 men the night of 
August 23 and at daylight the following day attacked the haying camp 
which consisted of about 350 infantry and about 70 cavalry from the 
Second Kansas Cavalry Regiment and the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry Regi-
ment. The objective of defeating the Federals, burning hay, and 
killing livestock was achieved. Watie did not intend to engage with 
equal numbers and the Federals were stronger than he anticipated, but 
he reported a successful mission with 20 Federals killed, 14 prisoners 
taken, and 150 mules and horses captured. Confederate losses were 
42 light, with 1 man killed and several men and horses wounded. 
The highly successful raids and demonstrations of the summer 
encouraged Maxey in early September to move his troops into even more 
daring and important action. Maxey listened eagerly to Watie, who 
41Maxey to Boggs, July 30, 1864, and August 6, 1864, ibid., pp. 
29-30; Fischer and Gill, "Confederate Indj.an Forces Outside of Indian 
Territory," The Chronicles of Oklahoma, Vol. XLVI, p. 281; Maxey to 
Scott, August 23, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute; Edwin C. 
Bearss, "General Cooper's CSA Indians Threaten Fort Smith," The 
Arkansas Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (Spring, 196 7), pp. 
257-284. 
42 Maxey to Boggs, August 31, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. 
XLI, Pt. 2, pp. 1095-1096; Maxey to Anderson, September 3, 1864, ibid., 
Pt. 1, p. 279; Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate 
Guerrilla," p. 76; Rampp, "The Twilight of the Confederacy in Indic:1-n 
Territory, 1863-1865," PP• 109-110. 
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desired to undertake a movement north. He hoped to attempt a raid 
into those portions of Indian Territory held by the Federals and per-
haps even i.nto Kansas. Watie presented his plan informally to Maxey, 
who considered the strategy highly desirable, and recormnended it to 
Kirby-Smith: 
Believing that in view of probable quiet below--that is, 
no effort to regain Little Rock and Pine Bluff this fall--
this movement would be the best that could be made for this 
district I have thought proper to lay it before you. I do 
this, as the last orders I received on the subject of this 
cormnand were to hold it in readiness to cooperate with 
movements below, orders under date May 19 last. Should 
General Watie prove successful it will be such a diversio'n 
as will prevent movements south from Fort Smith or Fort 
Gibson, and if well conducted will be attended with material 
results. I respectfully solicit an early reply.43 
Watie's plan with Maxey's endorsement arrived at Kirby-Smith's 
headquarters at a most opportune time. Kirby-Smith had been recently 
convinced by Major General Price that Price should conduct a fall 
campaign into northern Arkansas and southern Missouri to capture the 
Federal depot at St. Louis and raise new forces. Kirby-Smith believ~d 
the plan coming from Indian Territory could serve as a very important 
diversionary movement. Approval of the idea was transmitted on 
August 25 to Indian Territory, but not received until September 5; 
Watie was notified on September 12. Additional troops from Texas 
were also ordered to join Maxey for support. Plans were concluded 
and the movement of tr(?ops.$tarted on September 14, 1864. The Federals 
were first encountered in skirmishes on September 16 and 17, with the 
principal engagement of the campaign taking place at Cabin Creek, fifty 
43 Maxey to Kirby-Smith, August 18, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1973. 
44 
miles north of Fort Gibson, on September 19. 
Brigadier General Watie crossed into Federal-held territory with 
66 
2,000 men; consisting of 800 Indian troops and 1,200 white forces from 
Brigadier General Gano's Texas conunand. They first discovered Federal 
forces near Flat Rock in a small haying party of 125 men on September 
16. Having underestimated the size of the Confederate force, the 
Federals, most of whom were Negroes from the Kansas First Colored Volun-
teer Infantry Regiment, decided to fight and were trapped. Gano and 
Watie had observed the party through spy glasses and knew the over-
whelming odds. They surrounded the party and attacked from five dir-
ections. The Federal troops knew the Confederates would show no mercy 
because they were mainly Negroes. Although the Federals held out 
against the greatly superior Confederate numbers for two and one-half 
hours, all of their troops, except fifteen cavalrymenand four infantry-
men, were killed, wounded or captured. The Confederates suffered only 
three wounded while destroying wagons, mowing machines, and 3,000 tons 
45 
of hay. 
The Confederates quickly moved on to try to find the position of 
the supply train enroute to Fort Gibson. An advance force of 400 was 
sent to locate the train, which it found at Cabin Creek Station with 
44Boggs to Maxey, August 25, 1864, and Boggs to McCulloch, August 
25, 1864, ibid., pp. 1082, 1081; Maxey to Boggs, September 5, 1864, .. , 
ibid., Pt. 3, p. 911; Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the 
Civil War in the West (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1968),p. 202; Rampp, 11The Twilight of the Confederacy in Indian 
Territory, 1863-1865," pp. 112-120. 
45Ibid., pp. 115-138; Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand Watie, 
Confederate Guerrilla," pp. 77-82; Lary c. Rampp, "Negro Troop 
Activity in Indian Territory, 1863-1865," The Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
Vol. XLVII, No. 1 (Spring, 1969), pp. 550-557. 
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about 300 wagons and about 600 men. The remaining troops were called 
up, and shortly after midnight on September 19 the Confederates at-
tacked. The battle continued throughout the night and until 9:00 a.m. 
the following morning. The Federals were pushed away from the wagons 
and finally routed and scattered. The Confederates had captured a 
very valuable prize. Although 100 wagons, 6,000 tons of hay, and all 
agricultural machines were destroyed, the remaining supplies were 
estimated at over $1,500,000 in value. The Confederates.netted 130 
wagons and 740 mules and horses with only 45 casualties. Total Feder-
al casualties did not exceed 54. After their victory, the Confeder-
ates lost no time in returning to southern Indian Territory, and had 
46 safely withdrawn by September 29. 
Maxey was very pleased with the results achieved by his troops. 
In his corre,spondence with headquarters at Shreveport, he attempted 
to convey his satisfaction: "This expedition was a gallant under-
taking, handsomely performed, and the troops engaged deserve the 
thanks of their country •••• There has not been a more daring or 
successful raid according to size during the whole war •••• I rejoice 
47 
at this great success." Maxey was equally as complimentary in 
printing a general o,.:der announcing the raid and commending its 
leaders. He carefully reiterated the summer's many successes: 
46Rampp, "The Twilight of the Confederacy in Indian Territory, 
1863-1865," pp. 115-138; Maxey to Boggs, October 1, 1864, Official 
Records, Ser. i, Vol. XLI, Pt. 1, pp. 779-780; Hathaway, "Brigadier 
General Stand Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," pp. 77-82. 
47 Maxey to Boggs, September 27, 1864, September 30, 1864, and 
October 1, 1864, ibid., pp, 777-779. 
Since your return, almost every part of the command 
has been engaged. 
A steam boat laden with valuable stores has been 
captured, a regiment has been almost demolished in sight 
of the guns of Fort Smith, the survivors captured and the 
camp destroyed. 
Many guns and pistols have been taken, mail after 
mail has been captured, hay camps almost without number 
have been destroyed a:_!:IQs.,.Jle hay byrned;_ horses, mules and 
cattle have been wrested from the enemy and driven into 
our.lines. Vast amounts of Sutlers Stores have been 
captured. Wagons have been burned in gun shot of Fort 
Smith; the enemy has been virtually locked up in his 
Forts, and your successes have culminated in this most 
glorious victory, over which the Telegraph informs us 
the enemy is now wailing.48 
Maxey was quick to point out several other successful aspects of 
the raids to his superiors. He spoke glowingly about the morale of 
the troops and Indian-white relations: "Throughout the year the 
68 
morale of the command has been steadily on the increase Through-
out the expedition I am rejoiced to say perfect harmony and good will 
prevailed between the white and Indian troops, all striving for the 
common good of our beloved country •••• glorious results of this 
splendid achievement is the increased cheerfulness and confidence of 
49 
all in their prowess and ability to whip anything like equal numbers." 
He particularly commended Brigadier General Watie for promoting harmony 
by graciously stepping aside without argument in the Cabin Creek cam-
paign for ranking Brigadier General Gano, although the plan had been 
Watie's from the beginning.so 
With the end of the raid, military activity in Indian Territory 
48 General Order No. 61, October 7, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease 
Institute. 
49Ibid. 
SOibid.; Maxey to Boggs, October 7, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XLI, Pt. 1, PP• 780-781. 
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almost came to a complete standstill. Although Maxey and Watie still 
hoped for a raid into Kansas, there were insufficient supplies and 
materials for the troops to make the campaign possible, and the expe-
dition was eventually forgotten. Maxey prepared winter quarters for 
the Choctaw brigade at a camp between Perryville and Boggy Depot at the 
interseciion of the two main roads leading through Indian Territory, 
one from Fort Smith and one from Fort Gibson. 51 
The only military action affecting Indian Territory during the 
remainder of Maxey's tenure was the retreat of Major General Price 
from the Kansas City, Missouri, area. Price had suffered a series of 
setbacks in his raid and was withdrawing toward Indian Territory. 
Price was forced by defeat at Pilot Knob, Missouri, to abandon his 
plan to capture St. Louis and instead moved west toward Kansas City, 
Missouri. Price hoped to salvage his raid by raising new forces and 
capturing goods throughout Missouri and Kansas. However, further 
defeats outside Kansas City at Westport and Mine Creek sent Price 
hurrying toward Indian Territory and safety. The task of covering 
the retreat and providing Price with badly needed supplies was Maxey's. 
As rumors of disast,r'ous defeats filtered into Arkansas and Indian Ter-
ritory from Missouri, the new connnander of the District of Arkansas, 
Major General John Bankhead Magruder conceived an idea of helping 
Price with the aid of Maxey's troops. Magruder wanted to move in force 
from his position at Camden against Fort Smith, and Maxey was ordered 
to cooperate with him. It was Magruder's strategy to move Maxey's 
connnand for support to the southern part of the Arkansas military 
51 Maxey to Boggs, October 9, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, pp. 990-991. 
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district near Laynesport. Maxey was not pleased with this possibility, 
as he hoped to continue the successful harassment campaign{h,e.;had begun 
''J# 
against Fort Smith. It had been Maxey's feeling for many months that 
his troops would be of more use operating on the Arkansas River and as 
far north a.s possible. However, over Maxey' s protests, Magruder's 
wishes were followed, and on September 22, 1864, all of Maxey's troops, 
with the exception of Brigadier General Watie's, were ordered south 
52 to Laynesport. 
These circumstances and a series of awkward moves by Magruder 
created serious friction between the two corrnnanders. Maxey felt it 
was too late in the year to attempt the type of plan Magruder suggested, 
and that he had chosen a most inopportune time to move Maxey's troops 
south. "If he had let me alone six weeks after the Cabin Creek 
fight," Maxey complained, "he could have had no trouble about Fort 
S . h "53 mit • Unfortunately, Magruder also angered Maxey by presuming 
too much authority over Maxey's troops stationed at Laynesport. 
Magruder ordered Gano's brigade, now led by Colonel Edward J. Gurley, 
into Arkansas without consulting Maxey or asking his permission. "An 
effort was recently made," Maxey informed his wife, "by General Ma-
gruder to 'order' Gano's Brigade without an intimation of the sort to 
me to Murfreesboro, first, and afterward down the river. He didn't 
succeed. I wrote to Colonel Gurley Corrnnanding, that when I ordered 
52 Maxey to Boggs, September 11, 1864, Turner to Maxey, September 
16, 1864, and Boggs to Maxey, September 22, 1864, ibid., pp. 930, 938, 
951; Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the~' 
pp. 202-248. 




him it would be time enough to move, and E£! before." Colonel Gurley 
had hesitated before moving, which allowed enough time for Maxey, who 
was meeting with the Choctaw brigade at Armstrong Academy, to return 
and countermand the order. This incident created lasting tension 
55 
between Maxey and Magruder. 
Maxey was asked by Magruder to supply as much information as pos-
sible as to the best route to Fort Smith, the strength of its fortifi~ 
cations, the forces available from Indian Territory, and the advisa-
bility of troop movements. Maxey forwarded the request to Cooper, 
who was in the area, to obtain the latest reports. This transfer de-
layed Maxey's reply, and when Magruder attempted to locate Maxey, who 
had been called to Boggy Depot, he was unable to do so. Tension rose 
higher, for Magruder was becoming convinced that Maxey was being de-
liberately uncooperative. Maxey completed his correspondence with 
Magruder immediately on returning from Boggy Depot; his answer was not 
encouraging, but he informed Magruder that Cooper's force would cooper-
ate and form a junction at Fort Smith if told of the movement promptly 
and with certainty. 56 Maxey expressed his doubts about the campaign 
to Kirby-Smith: 
•' 
54 s. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, November 1, 1864, ibid. 
55Kirby-Smith to Maxey, November 4, 1864, Magruder to Boggs, 
November 7, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XLI, Pt. 4, pp. 
1028-1029, 1032-1033; S. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, November 6, 1864, 
Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
56cooper to Maxey, November 8, 1864, ibid.; Turner to Maxey, 
November l;i,, 1864, Magruder to Wharton, November 8, 1864, and Magruder 
to Boggs, November 13, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XLI, Pt. 
4, pp. 1025, 1034, 1043. 
I fear very much that he can't make the trip for want 
of forage •••• I don't think Magruder will find corn plenty 
on any road that he can take. I would much rather start to 
take Fort Smith with infantry than cavalry •••• Besides, 
can Magruder hold the place if he takes it? Where will he 
get supplies? 
The true campaign, in my opinion, was the one I 
adopted •••• Had not General Magruder got uneasy, pressing 
you to issue the order to move Gano's brigade to the line, 
I believe that in six weeks time from the fight at Cabin 
Creek, such inte;ruption to the enemy's supplies and destruc-
tion of hay, would have been made as would have compelled the 
evacuation of both Fort Smith and Fort Gibson during the 
winter •••• Whatever assistance I can render General Magruder 
you may rely upon implicitly. I greatly fear he is too late, 
and deeply regret I was not permitted by reason of his call 
to work out my own plan to the close of the campaigning 
season.57 
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Unhappy with what he considered deliberate delay and discourtesy, 
Magruder wrote Kirby-Smith requesting him to order Gano's brigade to 
Arkansas, where it would be under Magruder's direct conunand. He also 
wanted help from Kirby-Smith in deciding the advisability of moving on 
Fort Smith. Kirby-Smith would not issue an order moving Gano's brigade 
to Arkansas. Magruder was directed to contact Maxey, as earlier in-
structed, to complete any negotiations or plans for the attack. This 
negative response from his superiors, plus Maxey's unenthusiastic 
58 attitude, sufficiently discouraged Magruder from continuing his plan. 
He wrote Maxey of his decision to abandon the campaign: "It would 
take a very long time to arrange this cooperation between yourself and 
59 
myself, and we would be too late to serve General Price in any way." 
57 Maxey to Kirby-Smith, November 8, 1864, Ibid., p. 1036. 
58Magruder to Boggs, November 12, 1864, Kirby-Smith to Magruder, 
November 14, 1864, Magruder to Kirby-Smith, November 14, 1864, and 
Magruder to Wharton, November 14, 1864, ibid., pp. 1043, 1045, 1046-
1047. 
59 Magruder to Maxey, November 15, 1864, ibid., pp. 1050-1051. 
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The proposed military action was shelved, but not the mistrustful 
attitude that had developed between the two commanders. 
All effort for the next several weeks was. channeled toward secur-
ing supplies for the retreating army of Major General Price. Maxey 
was not sure of the route of the retreating army and was forced to 
store. supplies in all the principle depots. Price and his men entered 
Confederate held Indian Territory just north of the Arkansas River 
about thirty-five miles west of Fort Smith at Pheasant Ford on November 
7, 1864, and immediately headed toward Boggy Depot and Perryville 
where Maxey had accumulated supplies: "Every spare pound of breadstuffs 
has been set apart for the use of this command. Supplies for the same 
purpose are being accumulated here [Fort Towson] and at camp near 
Laynesport. Price's men have been arriving here for four or five days, 
60 singly, in squads, and every way." Most of his horses were in very 
poor condition and mules were sent to help with the transportation. All 
of the retreating troops, including Major General Price himself, headed 
toward Bonham, Texas, and had passed through Indian Territory to a 
f k b b 2, 1864. 61 point as ar as Laynesport, Aransas, y Decem er 
The explosive relationship between Maxey and Magruder again erupted 
in December. Maxey's men stationed at Laynesport continued to be a 
source of irritation to the Arkansas commander. He felt he should be 
able to control the brigade stationed there, and he hounded Kirby-Smith 
60 Maxey to Boggs, November 17, 1864, ibid., p. 1059. 
61 Scott to McLean, November 18, 1864, McLean to Maxey, November 18, 
1864, and Maxey to Boggs, November 20, 1864, ibid., pp. 1063, 1067-1068; 
kampp, "The Twilight of the Confederacy in Indian Territory, 1863-1865," 
pp. 141-142; Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the 
~' pp. 247-255; Ralph R. Rea,. Sterling Price, the Lee of the ~ 
(Little Rock: Pioneer Press, 1959), p. 151. 
with requests to place them under his direction: ''The commanding 
I 
officer of the brigade will not obey my order direct. Too much delay 
would be occasioned to send an order through General Maxey for the 
brigade to move. Will you please instruct General Maxey to give such 
directions to the commanding officer at Gurley's [Gano's] brigade as 
• 62 
will enable me to move in an emergency." Kirby-Smith refused to 
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take such action, so Magruder's next complaint took an entirely differ-
ent form. He decided Gano 1 s brigade should not be near Laynesport, 
and was in fact a detriment.~ 11 Gano's brigade is encamped below Laynes-
port, as I understand. This is done by General Maxey without the 
courtesy of asking my consent, and without the authority of any one 
that I am aware of. One Captain Lewis has written me that he has the 
authority of Major General Maxey to pass the winter with his company 
in my district •••• I respectfully recommend that Major General Maxey 
be ordered forthwith to remove Captain Lewis' company from my 
district." 63 
Lieutenant General Kirby-Smith sharply answered Magruder: "General 
Maxey was instructed by department headquarters to station Gano 1 s bri-
gade near Laynesport. This was done at your request that this brigade 
might be in a position to cooperate with you when the enemy's move-
ments made it necessary •••• Under the circumstance, I think you can 
no longer charge General Maxey with want of courtesy in this matter. 1164 
62 Magruder to Boggs, November 27, 1864, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XLI, Pt. 4, P• 1080. 
63 Magruder to Boggs, December 12, 1864, ibid., p. 1107. 
64Kirby-Smith to Magruder, December 21, 1864, ibid., 1121. 
Magruder would not allow the matter to quietly die, but included the 
subject in letters he wrote to Senator Robert W. Johnson of Arkansas 
and others. He complained that Maxey had forced his troops into the 
District of Arkansas without permission and had consumed a large 
portion of Arkansas supplies, all due to the assent of Kirby-Smith. 65 
Magruder again had to be reminded of the limits of his authority 
when he attempted to direct one of his officers to take possession of 
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the cantonment at Laynesport, and without proper authority he instructed 
Maxey to move his troops to Texas. "The cantonment at Laynesport will 
remain under General Maxey," Kirby-Smith impatiently informed Magruder, 
"and he has been so instructed. If you deem it necessary to move any 
cavalry into the interior of Texas, you will order one of the brigades 
66 under your command." 
In most of the disputes with Magruder, Maxey had felt it wise 
to remain as mute as possible, but in January, 1865, Maxey could re-
main silent no longer. Trouble again arose over Gano's brigade, now 
under the corrunand of Brigadier General Hamilton Pr:Loleau Bee. Maxey 
'·'· 
received a letter dated January 6, 1865, from Magruder asking him to 
hold Bee's brigade in readiness to support any movement in Arkansas. 
On January 18, 1865, Maxey received another communication from Magruder 
ordering the brigade to move to Van Zandt County, Texas. When Maxey 
questioned the contradictory orders, Magruaer replied that there had 
been a clerical error and that the order should have read on or near 
the Red River above Clarksville, Texas. This questioning angered 
65 Magruder to Johnson, December 27, 1864, ibid., 1127. 
66 Boggs to Magruder, January 20, 1865, ibid., Vol. XLVIII, Pt. 1, 
p. 133 7. 
Magruder and he again accused Maxey of being uncooperative. He also 
charged Maxey with supporting Colonel Gurley, temporary commander of 
Bee's brigade, in an insubordinate act. Gurley had refused to move 
unless ordered by Maxey, Kirby .. Smith, or the Secretary of War. The 
dispute between the officers continued unabated, and Magruder felt it 
necessary to file a complaint with headquarters. At this juncture 
Maxey decided to send a copy of all the communication between the two 
officers to Kirby-Smith to be filed. 67 
Maxey felt the need to defend his actions against the onslaught 
of Magruder's accusations: 111 discharge my duty conscientiously, in 
strict accordance with the laws and orders as I understand them, and 
hold myself amenable to my commanding officer for the manner in which 
76 
I perform my duty, and I am at all times ready and willing to have the 
most rigid scrutiny and investigation of my official conduct on this or 
h . 1168 any ot er question. As to the charge that he was uncooperative, 
Maxey said: 
I believe the records of the country, as well as of the 
State of Arkansas, prove that I have "cooperated" with the 
troops in that State with s.ome good results. I shall never 
fail, General, to obey the orders of my commanding officers, 
nor will I fail to protect, as far as in my power, the rights 
of any command intrusted to me. Whilst l jealously guard 
my own rights,. I will not infringe upon those of others. Having 
been ordered to cooperate with you, I shall to do cheerfuUy 
and to the best of my ability, and regret that any necessity 
should have arisen for this correspondence.69 
67 Maxey to Boggs, January 28, 1865, Maxey to Magruder, January 15, 
1865, Kimmel to Maxey, January 19, 1865, and Maxey to Magruder, 
January 27, 1865, ibid., pp. 1346-1351. 
68 Maxey to Magruder, January 27, 1865, ibid., p. 1349. 
69rbid., P• 1350. 
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The problem was tentatively settled by Kirby-Smith when he per-
sonally ordered Bee's brigade away from the Laynesport. area to Rusk, 
Cherokee County, Texas. Kirby-Smith telegraphed Magruder that he was 
not to try to divert the brigade. Other points of dispute did not 
develop as Maxey soon left Indian Territory and the unhappy relationship 
70 with Magruder. 
There were no Confederate military accomplishments on a large 
scale in Indian Territory in 1864. Maxey's plans were to strengthen 
and extend Confederate authority in Indian Territory. His main mili-
tary ambition to launch an offensive to recapture Fort Smith and Fort 
Gibson and move the line of defense back to the Arkansas River was not 
realized. It was never possible to acquire the necessary arms and 
supplies to attempt an attack unsupported by help from outside sources. 
Maxey adopted the most useful alternative for the skills of his troops, 
especially his Indian soldiers. He listened to his subordinate 
officers, observed the fighting ability of his forces, and concluded 
that they should be allowed to move uninhibited in harassment campaigns 
and raids. Maxey's evaluation of their ability was accurate; the 
Indian troops, with the added strength of Gano's brigade, were success-
ful when victories were essential to morale. Maxey's confidence in 
his forces and his lavish praise of their victories strengthened the 
fighting spirit and hope of the men. 
The Camden campaign in Arkansas at first appeared very disad-
vantageous for Maxey. He was wary of concentrating the majority of his 
70 Scott to Magruder, January 28, 1865, and Anderson to Maxey, 
February 6, 1865, ibid., pp. 1350-1351, 1369; Bee to Maxey, February 9, 
1865, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
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troops in an adjacent Confederate military district when he felt there 
was still a possibility of a combined cavalry raid by the Federals 
located at Fort Smith and Fort Gibson. It appeared to him that he was 
being asked to abandon his command. After making his doubts known and 
being reassured, he moved quickly to the aid of the Arkansas command. 
His fear of being an outsider w'i thrnore rank was well founded and repre-
sentative of his regard for his fellow officers; when confronted with 
the problem, he acted tactfully and courteously. Maxey commanded his 
men expertly, and they responded with skill and spirit. The success-
ful performances of the Indians helped them gain confidence and test 
their abilities. They returned to Indian Territory with a spirit 
which proved very beneficial in the summer campaigns of 1864. Maxey 
appreciated his Indian troops and their sacrifice and took every 
opportunity to remind his superiors that their decision to fight out-
side Indian Territory was voluntary. 
Maxey never abandoned his desire to recapture the upper reaches 
of Indian Territory lost during 1863, although he was forced on many 
occasions to modify his plans. The momentum from the Arkansas cam-
paign continued throughout the summer of 1864, and it was Maxey's 
thought that the demonstrations and raids near Fort Smith would 
eventually lead to the abandomnent of the post and open the way for 
the fall of Fort Gibson. It had been Maxey's feeling that the commander 
at Fort Smith would not retaliate, and he did not. The interruption 
of his plans by Major General Magruder was deeply resented by Maxey, 
for it seemed to him as if no one outside of his own camp cared about 
the welfare of Indian Territory. Maxey was resentful of the abandomnent 
of his plans for those which he felt were poorly and hastily formed and 
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implemented too late in the year. Bitter about Maxey's unenthusiastic 
response, Magruder became vindictive not only toward Maxey but also 
Lieutenant General Kirby-Smith. The exchanges of sharp dispatches was 
unbecoming of both officers; Maxey's attempt to stay as mute as possible 
throughout the affair was creditable. Effective relations between 
the Arkansas and Indian Territory corranands were virtually brought to 
an end. 
The successful Confederate military operations in Indian Terri-
tory in 1864 were largely the result of Maxey's skillful planning. His 
drive, positive attitude, and willingness to support his force pro-
vided the added incentive needed by his troops. Under Maxey's corranand, 
total Confederate defeat in 1863 in Indian Territory was changed to 
limited victory in 1864. 
CHAPTER V 
MAXEY'S REMOVAL AND POSTWAR CAREER 
Maxey's removal as commander of Indian Territory stemmed from a 
set of events engineered by Brigadier General Cooper. The decision to 
make the change was not impulsive but was carefully planned and maneu-
vered by Cooper and his friends. Cooper's desire for the command of 
Indian Territory had not diminished during 1864. He wanteq the 
assignment in December, 1863, when Maxey was chosen to replace Steele 
and he continued to agitate for the position. His opposition to Maxey 
came in the form of harassment, complaints, and finally direct personal 
contact with President Davis. Cooper was successful in his campaign. 
He was able to go over the head of his immediate superiors and convince 
others that Maxey's removal was imperative. Finally, Maxey was removed 
from his command position on February 21, 1865, and in the same order 
Brigadier General Cooper was assigned to the command of the District 
of Indian Territory. 
~axey had been warned about the ambitions of Cooper and the role 
he played in the departure of the previous Indian Territory commanders, 
and although he was able to anticipate some of the problems, Maxey 
could not possibly have known the devious means Cooper would use to 
obtain the command position. The first indication of trouble from 
Cooper arose early in 1864 shortly after Maxey's arrival. One of 
Maxey's initial actions involved the reorganization of his troops, a 
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project in which Cooper had much interest. Cooper and his friends 
hoped to have a reorganization plan implemented which would enhance 
their position. They wanted Indian Territory made a separate district, 
and a three brigade system placing Cooper in command of the entire white 
and Indian force as well as Superintendent of Indian Affairs. Mis-
understanding over the superintendency became the focal point of the 
dispute which resulted finally in the removal of Maxey. While Cooper's 
interpretation of the brigade system placed him as commander of the 
entire district, Kirby-Smith saw the new system with Cooper as com-
mander only of the Indian troops, a position which Kirby-Smith doubted 
Cooper could handle. In order to ensure consideration of their plan, 
Cooper and his supporters prevailed upon his friendship with President 
Davis. Cooper had been a captain in the regiment of Mississippi volun-
teers of which Davis was colonel during the Mexican War. Based on this 
relationship, Cooper persuaded President Davis to intervene. 1 
The order for reorganization came on February 22, 1864, and 
utilized the three brigade system, "the Indian troops to be pLaced 
2 under the immediate command of General Cooper." The dispute centered 
around the meaning of "Indian troops". Cooper's broad interpretation 
gave.the entire command of both Indian and white troops to him. 
Kirby-Smith's literal interpretation identified only the Indian troops 
as part of Cooper's command. When Cooper questioned his position he 
was assured by Kirby-Smith that he was to remain under the command of 
1Abel, The American Indian as Participant in the Civil War, pp. 
314-318; Portlock to Maxey, January 13, 1864, M;;ey Papers, Gilcrease 
Institute. 
~axey Circular, May 14, 1864, ibid. 
Maxey. Cooper was not satisfied. He was sure President Davis meant 
for him to have the entire command, and he continued to prevail upon 
Davis to clarify his intentions. 3 Some months later Maxey unburdened 
himself: 
I have forwarded ••• a packa,ge of papers sent here by 
General Cooper ostensibly in support of his pretensions to 
the command of this District--really in my opinion to 
create trouble and if possible disgust me as he has every 
other officer sent here to command •••• I determined to 
give General C[ooper] no ground for complaint, but I am 
satisfied that he is now seeking to produce the impression 
on the people that the President in his letter ••• promised 
him command of the Indian Territory. 
Nothing you will see is farther from the truth.. General 
Cooper in my opinion perfectly understands that letter. More 
may ask why I do not place him in arrest, 1st General Cooper 
works through others and does not show his hand, on the con-
trary expresses great fairness of purpose. 2nd, He has a 
very considerable influence with the Indians, and a step of 
that kind however just and well supported it might be by 
clearest evidence ever, would probably, indeed most likely, 
prove detrimental to the service. 
But General c[ooper] has not the power to injure me, that 
he has others. His game has been found out by many~ and I 
believe he can no longer successfully play it.4 
Military action in Arkansas caused delay in considering Cooper's 
communication with President Davis. However, the next confrontation 
came quickly after Maxey's return in late April from the successful 
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Arkansas campaign. The already complex problem was further aggravated 
by a seemingly unrelated situation. A rash of promotions followed the 
victories in Arkansas, and being proud of his troops and his own 
leadership, Maxey was hurt and angered when he observed others who had 
participated in the campaign receiving promotions while he received no 
3 Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, Anderson to Cooper, 
February 20, 1864, and Cooper to Davis, February 29, 1864, Official 
Records, Ser. i, Vol. XXXIV, Pt. 2, pp. 856-858, 1007-1008. 
4 Maxey to Williamson, June 3, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease 
Institute. 
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recognition. He felt so deeply about this that he tendered his resig-
nation to Kirby ... Smith as a brigaqier general in the Confederate States 
Anny. Maxey wrote briefly of his past service with the South and 
added: 
That General Smith has the power to select those he will 
recommend for promotion I do not gainsay, and doubtless I have 
placed a higher estimate on such services than he has., but in 
my view the honor of a gentleman and an officer should be held 
by him dearer than any earthly promotion. Had I not partici-
pated in that campaign I would have had nothing to say. Having 
done so, and commanded in one of the most successful battles 
fought there, I cannot reconcile it to my sense of honor to be 
overlooked whilst others, my juniors, for doing no more are 
promoted over my he.ad. Were I to do so the world would con-
clude that I had neglected my duty in that campaign, and by 
quietly submitting, I would tacitly acquiesce in that 
decision.5 
Maxey•s letter made no further progress than the office of Major 
George Williamson, an officer on Kirby-Smith's staff and a friend of 
Maxey•s. Williamson did not want to officially file the resignation, 
as he was aware of the status of Maxey's promotion. Kirby-Smith had 
ordered the advancement of Maxey weeks earlier to the rank of major 
general, but through an oversight the information had not yet reached 
6 Maxey. "In a conversation with the.General yesterday about your 
promotion," Major Williamson informed Maxey, "he told me he had 
directed the order issued several weeks ago and was annoyed that it 
had not been more promptly attended to .... You will be gratifie1 to 
observe you take rank from the date of the battle of Poison Spring, 
18 April, 1864. This makes you senior, I believe, to any of the Major 
Generals whose promotions were announced before yours. l congratulate 
5Maxey to Anderson, May 20, 1864, ibid. 
6General Order No. 24, May 19, 1864, ibid. 
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you most heartily on this well deserved honor. 11 7 
Further word from Kirby-Smith apologizing for the delay alleviated 
Maxey's anxiety: "I regretted very much that your appointment as 
Major General was not more promptly forwarded to you, it was delayed 
through an oversight in the office. 118 He also expressed satisfaction 
and thanks for the manner in which Maxey administered affairs in Indian 
Territory: "I know the annoyances and difficulties with which you have 
been environed. I feel that a great improvement has already been made. 
There probably remains much yet to be accomplished. You may rely upon 
9 every assistance in my power to support you in your reforms." 
Maxey was very much relieved and pleased that he had been recog-
nized for his duties in Arkansas and equally pleased with Kirby-Smith's 
praise. "I am more than gratified at your expression of satisfaction 
with my administration," Maxey assured Kirby-Smith. "The vast labor 
devolving on the District Commander of the Indian Territory is not 
known or appreciated by the people. A brilliant dash that requires 
but little trouble and not much brains will give a man more character 
• h h h I h d 1 b • d • • • d • 11 10 wit t e masses tan a years ar a or 1n a m1n1strat1ve ut1es. 
Maxey further explained the feeling behind his impulse to resign: 
In regard to the delay of issuing the order of my 
promotion it is but candid in me to say that I felt it to 
the quick, as it could only be construed as far as the facts 
were known to me or my friends as an official censure of my 
military career under your command. Feeling that I had done 
7Williamson to Maxey, May 21, 1864, ibid. 
8Kirby-Smith to Maxey, June 8, 1864, ibid. 
9rbid. 
10 
Maxey to Kirby-Smith, June 12, 1864, ibid. 
my whole duty and in acting under the sense of this,: as I 
then thought, censure, I was unwilling in justice to myself 
to remain in the service. Had no promotion been made I 
should never have uttered a word. My only regret in regard 
to the delay is that I should have thought you capable of 
doing me an injustice.11 
Before the resignation matter had been clarified for Maxey and 
the officers of his command, word began to spread of Maxey' s decision 
to quit the Confederate service. The news was met with deep regret 
by many of his men. A group of them decided to draw up a petition 
in support. of Maxey to be signed by as ma.ny white and Indian troops 
as "feel that it is a matter of the greatest importance to retain 
General Maxey in his present comrnand. 11 Copies of the petition were 
circulated throughout Indian Territory and northern Texas to gather 
expressions of opinion which might influence Kirby .. Smith. "I believe 
the immediate cause of General Maxey's resignation," said the officer 
who wrote the petition, "was the promotion of officers whom he com-
manded in the recent campaign in Arkansas over him. And while I ad-
mire his spirit I do not think his services can be spared from his 
12 present conmand. 11 -
The petition stat~d in great detail the peculiar problems con-
nected with Indian Territory and emphasized the great importance of 
85 
the area. The signers felt that in order to appreciate Maxey the unique 
conditions in Indian Territory must. be understood, such as the absence 
of civil government, the mixture of races, the dependency on other 
11Ibid. 
12Elinson to Marston, May 21, 1864, ibid. 
states for most supplies, and the despair and demoralization of the 
troops, all of which called for not only administrative ability but 
military skill and daring. Those who signed the petition agreed: 
That in our present commander we have the qualifications 
and requirements necessary so far as we can expect to find 
them united. 
That he has the entire confidence of the Indian Nations 
as a people whose interests he superintends, of the. Army and 
every portion of it which he has successfully commanded of the 
people of the Northern Sub District Texas upon whom he depends 
for material and moral support, And therefore, it having come 
to our knowledge (unofficially) that Brigadier General S, B, 
Maxey cormnanding the District of the Indian Territory has 
tendered his resignation as an officer in the Provisional 
Army of the Confederate States, we as citizens most deeply 
interested in the fate of the country embraced within or 
protected by his command as members of the Army in whose 
success our honor and pride are involved feel it our duty 
to petition most respectfully (and without the knowledge or 
consent of General Maxey) that your action be witheld 
until the grounds upon which this step is taken, if they be 
personal can be reconsidered, or if public and official they 
receive rour most careful consideration and if possible be 
removed. 3 
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When a copy of the petition reached Cooper he was greatly angered. 
He felt that the petition violated army regulations against conveying 
praise or censure toward superiors in military service. "! submit 
that the [petition] conveys extraordinary praise upon General Maxey," 
Cooper charged, "and reflects injuriously upon his predecessors or 
anyone hitherto found willing to undertake the arduous duties of Com-
. . 14 mandant of the District of Indian Territory." He wrote Kirby-Smith 
to complain about the petition and to again question the command of 
Indian Territory. Cooper emphasized once more that President Davis 
truly desired to have him as commander of the entire District of Indian 
13Petition to Kirby-Smith, May 27, 1864, ibid. 
14 Cooper to Kirby-Smith, May 29, ibid. 
Territory. He felt Kirby-Smith was deliberately misinterpreting the 
desire of President Davis t.o continue Maxey in command. Kirby-Smith 
informed Cooper that his decision had not changed. Cooper had pre-
sented no new facts to change Kirby-Smith's decision that Cooper was 
15 to remain under the command of Maxey. Maxey decided he must accept 
Cooper's interference and place his confidence in Kirby-Smith. "So 
far as General c[ooper] .is concerned," said Maxey, "I think he may 
work as much as he pleases. He is welcome to all he makes. 1116 
But Cooper was determined to make a place for himself in the 
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connnand structure of Indian Territory. Cooper's influence with Presi-
dent Davis did not diminish and finally obtained results. The letters 
and corrnnunications from Cooper's first complaints plus his friends' 
influence in Richmond were finally answered in July, 1864. A special 
order was sent to Kirby-Smith directing him to place Cooper in command 
of the District of Indian Territory. Kirby-Smith was extremely reluc-
tant to replace Maxey and simply did not put the order into effect. 
He waited until October to write President Davis and ask to have the 
order rescinded. 17 "I believe that serious injury would result to the 
service were this order enforced," Kirby-Smith told Cooper. "I have 
delayed its publication, awaiting further instruction. General Maxey, 
connnanding the district of the Indian country, has with skill, judge-
ment, and success administered his duties. I have satisfactory evi-
15Maxey to Williamson, June 3, 1864, Cooper to Boggs, May 29, 1864, 
and Williamson to Cooper, June 14, 1864, ibid. 
16 
S. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, June 13, 1864, ibid. 
17 
Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: 
People, Vol. I, p. 355; Kirby-Smith 
Official Records, Ser. i, Vol. XLI, 
~ History of the State and Its 
to Cooper, October 1, 1864, 
Pt~: 3, p. 971. 
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dence for believing that he gives satisfaction to both Indian and white 
troops. His removal, besides being an injustice to him, would be a 
18 
misfortune to the department." 
Kirby-Smith was told by Cooper that the order was considered im-
perative by the President and must be carried into effect. But still 
Kirby-Smith hesitated. He continued to hope that he would not have to 
put the order into effect, and, if the order must be honored, he 
wanted to be able to place Maxey in a new position which would carry 
responsibilities befitting his rank of major general. There was no 
comparable position as commander of an entire district available, but 
Kirby-Smith hoped to create a position for Maxey which would not be 
"d d d · 19 consi ere a emotion. 
In order to assure Maxey of such an office, it was necessary for 
President Davis to confirm the promotion of Maxey to major general as 
recommended the previous May by Kirby-Smith. However, President Davis 
refused to confirm any general officers until there was a complete 
reorganization of the troops within the Trans-Mississippi Department. 
Since it was s.o important that Maxey receive a confirmation of his 
promotion to ensure a new position more equal to the command position 
in Indian Territory, Kirby-Smith recommended that the department be 
organized into three army corps. Within the new system Maxey was 
assigned to the First Army Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Simon 
B. Buckner. Maxey was to command the Second Texas Cavalry Division of 
the First Army Corps. This new structure was made on paper to Presi-
18rbid. 
19rbid. 
dent Davis, but to avoid the transfer of Maxey, he was temporarily 
detached from the Second Texas Cavalry Division by Kirby-Smith and 
assigned to his present position as commander of Indian Territory. 20 
These maneuverings did not enhance Maxey's security, and unsure 
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of the consequences, Maxey placed his trust in Kirby-Smith and justice. 
"I am very glad this has been done," Maxey told his wife, "for should 
trickery succeed in giving command here, to General Cooper, which 
however I do not believe, I nevertheless have a splended Division, 
21 
all Texans." As rumors of his removal began to circulate within 
Indian Territory, others became involved. While the situation unfolded, 
members of Maxey's command began to write and question him about the 
possibility: 
There have been rumors here for several days that you 
are to be relieved in this District and General Cooper 
placed in command. Whether there is any just grounds for 
such complaints I can't say not being posted in matters 
beyond my own affairs but it has given me much cause of 
uneasiness and I have not slept soundly since I heard it 
I have ever been an ardent admirer of yours and 
have always spoken of you in the highest terms and upheld 
your sound policy as being the best ever presented in 
this·'District and we have seen the brilliant effect of it. 
The Indians today prefer you to General Cooper, and my 
men would die by you and some have gone so far as to 
say they will not serve in this District under General 
Cooper.22 
Maxey became uneasy and could no longer ignore the rumors and 
20Boggs to Maxey, October 14, 1864, ibid., pp. 1008-1009; Kirby-
Smith to Cooper,. October 28, 1864, ·ibid., Pt. 4, p. 1016; Organiza .. 
tion of the Army of the Trans-Mississippi Department, Kirby .. Smith, 
C. S. Army, commanding, September 30, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, pp. 966-971; 
Boggs to Maxey, October 15, 1864, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease Institute. 
21 S. B. Maxey to Marilda Maxey, October 15, 1864, ibid. 
22 Johnson to Maxey, October 16, 1864, ibid. 
the increasing unrest they caused in Indian Territory. He approached 
headquarters for confirmation or refutation of the reports: 
I do not desire command here, God knows it has been a 
command of incessant labor and vexation ever since I have 
had it, and has been to every man who has commanded here, 
and will be to the end of the war •••• These rumors of 
course paralyze to a certain extent my administration. If 
I have done well, it is bu~ justice to me and the country 
that I be su.stained, if the reverse that I be removed and 
a better man put here. My record is made up, and I do not 
believe I could better it, and whilst I do not desi.re this 
command I am unwilling silently to submit to any action I 
am compelled to regard as unjust to my reputation.23 
The answer from headquarters was not of much comfort to Maxey. 
He was informed of the July order from President Davis placing Cooper 
in command of Indian Territory. He was also told of Kirby-Smith's 
effort to have the order revoked. Kirby-Smith intended to take no 
action on the order unless further instruction came from the office 
of President Davis. Maxey had no choice but to accept his tenuous 
position and rely on the judgment of his superiors. The frustration 
caused by the maneuverings over which he had no control was apparent 
in his correspondence: 
My course has been endorsed by the Department Commander, 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Council of the Tribes 
and Nations in Alliance, the people in the contiguous posi-
tions of Texas and Arkansas, and above all by my own 
conscience, and whatever action the War Department or the 
President may see fit to take, I shall not rest satisfied. 
The command of the District is not desirable. There are 
more embarrassing elements '·to contend with there than 
elsewhere and the labor, physical and menta4 is very great. 
I was however unwilling to be relieved by any order that 
had the appearance of censure. So far as my own reputation 
is concerned, it will not be increased or diminished by the 
action of the War Department whatever it may be. I went 
into this War for the good of the Country, and have as much 
23 Maxey to Boggs, October 24, 1864, ibid. 
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interest in success as the President or any other citizen 
And when I have the blessing of an approving conscience, 
I care little for the opinions of men.25 
.... 
Maxey continued to carry out his duties, hopeful that he and his com-. 
mand would be justified and vindicated. He remained secure in the 
knowledge that Kirby-Smith would do all that he could to help him 
obtain justice. 
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However, by early 1865 Maxey began to feel the uselessness of his 
position, and he believed he could no longer be effective. When in 
mid-February, 1865, special orders were issued naming Cooper as 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Maxey felt he could not continue 
in his command: 26 
The duties of Superintendent and District Commander 
have so long been discharged by the same officer that they 
are now so intimately blended as to be difficult of separa-
tion. With some twelve thousand destitute Indians to be 
fed by the Superintendent and the troops by the District 
Commander and the subsisting of all carried on through the 
agency of the Commissary Department it would be exceedingly 
difficult with the best intentions to prevent collision. 
For the good of the service, and to enable the 
business of the District to be conducted in a system, which 
I believe the true interests of the service requires, I 
would respectfully ask to be relieved of service in the 
District of the Indian Territory at the earliest moment 
which in the opinion of the General Commanding the Depart-
ment my services can hopefully be spared.27 
Before action could be taken on Maxey's request, the order reliev-
ing him of his command was received at the Trans-Mississippi Depart-
ment headquarters. Cooper had made a trip to Richmond in early 1865 
to confer with President Davis. The results were obvious in a short 
24 Boggs to Maxey, October 28, 1864, ibid. 
25 ,Maxey to Kirby-Smith, November 12, 1864, ibid. 
26 Boggs to Maxey, February 9, 1865, and Special Order No. 40, 
February 14, 1865, ibid. 
time for Kirby-Smith and Maxey were unable to stop Cooper. Thus 
Maxey was relieved of the Indian Territory command and Cooper was 
assigned to it on February 21, 1865. 28 In the order relieving Maxey, 
Kirby-Smith stressed his entire satisfaction with the manner in which 
Maxey had discharged his duties. He explained that Maxey was being 
relieved to take on more import.ant duties. Kirby-Smith had been 
able to prevent Cooper's elevation to the Indian Territory command 
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for over seven months, but the personal relationship between President 
Davis and Cooper made Cooper's advancement a virtual personal appoint-
ment. On leaving Indian Territory, Maxey published his opinions in 
an open letter to his command: 
In leaving the District, the undersigned [Maxey] 
returns his grateful acknowledgements to the Army and 
people of his District, and of the Northern Sub District 
of Texas from whence his supplies have been drawn, for 
their support of his administration. 
He [Maxey] feels that he has discharged his duty, 
and that the Troops of the District have done gallant 
and good service, since he has been in command. 
As Superintendent his duties have been onerous 
and complicated. He has used every exertion in his 
power, with the limited means at his command, to relieve 
the necessities of the unfortunate but patttcrtic 
Refugee Indians. 
The undersigned [Maxey] would earnestly impress 
upon every officer and soldier and upon every citizen of the 
District the absolute necessity of harmonious and united 
action •••• the absolute necessity of upholding and sus-
taining the new District Commander in the arduous and com-
plicated duties that will devolve upon him.29 
The reactions to Maxey's removal were varied. Kirby-Smith was 
very uneasy about the change in command and the manner in which it 
27 Maxey to Anderson, February 17, 1865, ibid. 
28Abel, The American Indian~. Participant l!! the Civil War, p. 
3·34; Special Order No. 45, Feb'l'ua-ry 21, 1865 1 -Offic1al Records, Ser. 
i, Vol. XLVIII, Pt., I, p.- 1396. 
29 
General Order No. 7, February 24, 1865, Ma11rey Papers, Gilcrease 
Institute .. 
was accomplished: "The change has not.tJ:i,e concurrence of my judge-
ment, and I believe will not result beneficially. Cut off as the 
department commander is from direct communication with Richmond, he 
should not be made responsible for events which may transpire in the 
districts under his command, unless he controls their commanders and 
30 has the power to changing them when circumstances demand." 
Maxey•s friends expressed understanding and appreciation. "Mr. 
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Davis was detennined his old friend and fellow soldier should command 
the District of Indian Territory notwithstanding the advice of General 
E. K. [Edmund Kirby] to the contrary," Maxey was told. 111 know not 
whether to congratulate you or not, I have no doubt it is the least 
desirable command in the Dept., but it is higher than any position you 
can now be assigned. 1131 A Texas friend was quite lauda.tory: 
Well may you congratulate yourself on being relieved 
from such a command and a transf~r to·field service, but 
I cannot feel that the Dist. you leave and the Northern Sub 
District of Texas can consistently join in such a feeling, 
and-really feel that our houses and offices need be hung 
with mourning for the loss of one as far as was possible with 
such material, by almost inhuman efforts under great disad-
vantages brought order out of chaos in the Dist., and by un-
tiring energy and vigilance aided much, very much in giving 
peace and quiet to the area, for myself I can only say that 
I really mourn your loss to myself and our people and cannot 
expect to find in another the same kind friend and watchful 
officer that we have found in you.32 
Many of Maxey's officers and men were unhappy about his removal 
and asked to be allowed to accompany him. i•Your distinguished ability 
3°Kirby-Smith to Cooper, March 2, 1865, Official Records, Ser. i, 
Vol. XLVIII, Pt. 1, PP• 1408-1409. 
31 Anderson to Maxey, February 23, 1865, Maxey Papers, Gilcrease 
Institute. 
32 McCulloch to Maxey, March 4, 1865, ibid. 
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as a military commander as well as an administrative officer has 
won you the respect and admiration of all who know you," said one 
of Maxey's officers, "Your high reputation and your uniform courtesy 
and kindness have rendered my position as one of your staff both 
honorable and pleasant,,,, I respectfully ask ••• to have me ordered 
h 1133 to report to you w erever you may go, The surgeon in his command 
also asked for transfer: "It is my preference to be in your command, 
having served more pleasantly there, than in that of any other officer 
under whom I have been placed since the war. I will deem it quite an 
34 
honor to be permitted to continue with you. 11 Another expressed his 
feelings simply: 11A feeling of hopelessness seems to have seized upon 
me in view of this change. Indeed, I am sorry. I know of no General, 
who can supply your place, or under whom I shall be willing to hold 
position. I wish I could go with you. 11 
35 
Maxey was ordered to report to headquarters in Shreveport, 
Louisiana, where he was reassigned to a new command in Texas, con-
structed from existing commands. Two brigades were quickly available 
for formation; the third was drawn from two existing infantry brigades, 
each of which detached one regiment plus one dismounted cavalry regi-
ment. The new command was completed in March, 1865, but the war was 
drawing rapidly to a close. Little could be accomplished beyond 
organization in Maxey's new command before Kirby-Smith surrendered the 
white troops of the Trans-Mississippi Department on May 26, 1865! 
33 Bell to Maxey, February 20, 1865, ibid. 
34 Alexander to Maxey, February 28, 1$65, ibid. 
35 Lee to Maxey, March 6, 1865, ibid. 
36 
Maxey's military career was at an end. 
Maxey was forty years of age when he returned to his family and 
his law practice in Paris, Texas. He was forced to wait before he 
could again resume the duties of an attorney, for the governor of 
Texas, A. J. Hamilton, had issued a proclamation which suspended 
former officers of the Confederate Army from practicing law without 
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a special. pardon from President Andrew Johnson. Through special inter-
cession by General Ulysses s. Grant to President Johnson beginning in 
37 January, 1866, Maxey was pardoned, "S. B. Maxey resigned from the 
Regular Army in 1849 and afterwards settled in Texas," Grant explained. 
111 knew him well as a cadet at West Point and afterwards as a Lieu-
tenant in the Mexican War. I believe him to be well worthy of Executive 
clemency and heartily recommend it. 1138 After needless delay, Maxey 
received his pardon on July 20, 1867. 
Maxey was then free to practice law, and his business grew as 
well as his acquaintances with other lawyers and politicians. As he 
traveled throughout Texas on legal matters,. he met and talked with 
many men who were active in state politics during the Reconstruction 
era. He also continued his relationship with political friends from 
Kentucky, including two governors and United States Attorney General 
39 James Speed. 
36 . 
Boggs to Walker, March 14, 1865, and Special Order No. 73, 
_ Ma1Pch . ..:it;J1.;";u,651; Official Records;, Ser. i; Vol. XLVIII, Pt. 1, 
PP• 1424, 1447. 
37 Horton, "Samuel Bell Maxey on the Coke-Davis Controversy," The 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. LXXII, p. 520. 
38 Grant quoted in ibid. 
39Ibid., p. 521. 
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In 1873, Maxey was appointed to a federal judge~hip for the Eighth 
Judicial District of Texas. Howeve~, ~ince he had ,yes on i higher 
position, he declined the appointment~ and in 1874.ran for the United· 
I . , ' . 
States Senate. With th~ end of the tie~~nstr~ction/period.i'~ Texas, .he 
\ ' 
was elected as a Democrat and took his seat in March, 1875. He re-
placed a Republican, J. W. Flanagan, in the Senate, which at that time 
contained a Republican majority. Maxey served for two terms, until 
1887, when he was defeated for reelection. While in the Senate he 
served on the connnittees on territories, military operations, educa-
tion and labor, and was chairman of the connnittee on post offices. 
He advocated economy, but also introduced several bills for river and 
harbor improvements across the nation. He obtained separate appropri-
ations for Texas rivers, harbors, and post. roads.. He struggled to 
secure frontier protection and enlarged postal facilities. On consti-
tutional grounds,. he was opposed to the policy of protective tariffs. 
One of his most important contributions, based on his background in 
Indian Territory, was his many speeches on Indian-white relations. 
He was among the first to advocate individual farms as the ultimate 
solution to the Indian problem. He.was also one of the first to 
approve right-of-ways for railroads through Indian Territory to facili-
tate innnigration and· connnerte·. After his defeat in 1887, he retired 
from public office to continue his law practice until his death in 
1895 at Eureka Springs,. Arkansas. He was buried in Evergreen Cemetery, 
P . T 40 ar1s, exas. 
40Ibid., pp. 521-522; Johnson, Malone, Starr, Schuyler, James, 
eds., Dictionary of American Biograp'hy, Vol. x;I, p. 436; Evans, ed., 
Confederate Military History, Vol. XI~ p. 248. 
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Maxey•s removal as the Confederate commander of Indian Territory 
was obviously the result of a complex and deeply rooted problem. His 
dismissal was not a repudiation of his administration, but the result 
of the maneuvering and ambition of Cooper. Maxey had done his job 
thoroughly and successfully and to the complete satisfaction of his 
superior in the Trans-Mississippi Department. It was only with ex-
treme reluctance and after much hesitancy that Kirby-Smith replaced 
Maxey with a man whom he felt was no equal to Maxey in ability. 
Cooper's agitation was a constant thorn to Maxey as well as to Kirby-
Smith. It was only the tenacity of Kirby-Smith that maintained Maxey 
for the last nine months of his tenure. Maxey was caught helplessly 
in a situation he could not control. He frustratedly examined his 
record of achievements, his hopes, and his plans to find a just reason 
for the dismissal, but to no avail. The position was not to be filled 
on merit but on undeserved pohtical appointment. 
Maxey had both Indian and white enemies in Indian Territory who 
felt that Cooper would make the best commander, but the majority of 
the people believed he had succeeded in his command and supported him. 
Maxey smarted under the possible interpretation of failure attached 
to his removal. However, most of his friends and supporters had 
followed the stratagem of Cooper and understood that there was no 
stigma attached to Maxey's removal. At best, Indian Territory was 
not the easiest of assignments and Maxey was burdened with the added 
trouble of an ambitious fellow officer undermining his efforts. If 
dishonor was connected with the change of commanders in Indian Terri-
tory, it was not Maxey's, but must be borne by Cooper. Maxey's return 
to his civilian career was securely based on years of hard work. Being 
well known and respected by many for his warti~e efforts, knowledge, 
and judgment, he was able to subsequently enjoy a productive and 
personally enhancing political· career. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Major General Maxey commanded Indian Territory for approximately 
fourteen months from December 11, 1863, to February 21, 1865. Hear-
rived at a time when Confederate fortunes and troop morale were at 
their lowest ebb. Federal forces had defeated the troops at every 
encounter for many months. The Indians had not received payment on 
the promises made them by their treaties with the Confederacy, and arnis 
were scarce, as were supplies and adequate leadership. The troops were 
in need of reorganization, and they needed a trustworthy and effective 
commander who could lead and provide for them despite pressures from 
Cooper and his supporters. 
Maxey's background and temperament were such that he appeared to 
his superior, Lieutenant General Kirby-Smith, to be the most able 
military commander available to undertake the leadership duties of 
Indian Territory. Having lived in Paris, Texas, for several years, 
Maxey was aware of the importance of Indian Territory to northern 
Texas and was very familiar with the terrain and conditions of the 
area. He had made many friends in Texas who believed in his abilities 
and were willing to support his efforts in Indian Territory. Since 
September, 1861, Maxey had commanded under a variety of circumstances 
and had gained valuable experience as well as skill and confidence in 
his administrative abilities. Maxey's training as an attorney quali~ 
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fied him for the task of inspiring and encouraging hh troops through 
vivid and effective rhetoric. 
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Maxey soon found he would need all of his- resources to handle the 
necessary reorganization. At first he hoped to launch an offensive that 
would secure the area, raise the morale of the troops with action and 
victory, ancl provide a cohesive agent. for his troops. Such a movement 
he soon concluded would be out of the question. Not only were military 
supplies lacking and morale very low, but even more frustrating, suf-
ficient supplies could not be obtained. Long one of the least important 
of the many military districts of the Confederacy, Indian Territory was 
last on the list for supplies. All the necessities for merely main-
taining troops were extremely scarce or non-existent. It was not 
possible to move troops with such inadequate food and clothing and be-
yond question to expect them to fight with the firearms i.n their posses-
sion. Although Maxey made effort after effort to secure arms through 
proper channels, inadequate quantity and quality of arms plagued him 
for his entire tenure. With every promise broken, with every plea ig-
nored, he was forced to rely more and more on captured arms and supplies 
for most of his needs. 
In order to prepare for future offensive activity, Maxey provided 
for troop reorganization and attempted to improve supply movements. A 
new three brigade system was implemented which would enable the Indians 
to fight as nations and hopefully promote a better recruiting system. 
In order to encourage fair treatment, he made every effort to discour-
age desertions and return all deserters to their commands. He under-
stood the need to keep some reliable white troops with the Indians to 
act as scouts and instructors. He also inaugurated a more reliable 
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spy system. Due to destitute Confederate conditions in Indian Terri-
tory, he was forced to rely heavily on Texas for his commissary 
supplies. All food stuffs were shipped in wagons from Texas as well as 
a great deal of the clothing needed by the troops. To obtain sup.plies 
more efficiently, he utilized his friendships in Texas as much as 
possible. He also attempted to hire more and better wagons from the 
surrounding area. When this failed, as well as his appeal to head-
quarters for extra ox-wagons, he authorized his quartermaster to use 
whatever means was necessary to acquire wagons--a method which proved 
successful. 
Not only must Maxey provision his troops from very inadequate 
supply sources, but he must also provide for thousands of destitute 
refugee Indian families. Maxey had a dual function; he was Super-
intendent of Indian Affairs as well as the military commander of Indian 
Territory. To Maxey, the task of supplying both groups made the two 
offices so intertwined that they could not be separated. If two separ-
ate commanding officers were competing for the same supplies from the 
same source, this could very easily cause dissension and inefficiency. 
Maxey proved to be an innovative Superintendent of Indian Affairs. 
He created three new offices for better handling of Indian supplies. 
He appointed a Superintendent of Issues to enroll all heads of Indian 
families and compile accurate tribal rolls. The new office of Issuing 
Agent was expected to efficiently and accurately distribute provisions 
to the families. The third off ice, no.t adequately described, was that 
of Inspector of Camps. The need for other offices developed as the 
system grew and Maxey gained experience. He was also responsible for 
obtaining funds due the Indians from the Confederate government. 
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One of the more important and productive of Maxey's plans in 
dealing with the Indians was to communicate as much as possible with 
the leaders of the various tribes. He met with the influential members 
of each of the tribes as often as possible in their council meetings 
and made various speeches. He was a fiery orator and on many occa-
sions used his skill to persuade the Indians to remain loyal to the 
Confederate cause when they could easily have despaired. He also ef-
fectively used a printing press which he had installed at his head-
quarters at Fort Towson to distribute information designed to sway the 
Indians and rally their spirit. He likewise did his best to understand 
and help his Indian forces. He tried to minimize their weaknesses and 
optimize their strengths in obtaining the best results from them as 
soldiers and men. He did his utmost to encourage mutual respect and 
tolerance between Indian and white troops. He was always as fair as 
possible in. decisions affecting these relationships. He expected his 
officers of equal rank to be given the same privileges and respect 
whether Indian or white. 
Military operations in 1864 were not as extensive or as effective 
as Maxey had hoped and planned. He had set as his primary goal the 
recapture of Fort Smith and Fort Gibson through an aggressive offensive 
campaign. All of his military plans and supportive efforts were made 
with this goal in mind. When it became obvious that this would not be 
possible without help from others, he encouraged Arkansas operations 
which could include his design for Indian Territory. To this end 
Maxey and his troops parti~ipated actively in the Camden campaign with 
the thought that this movement would sweep northward and carry with it 
Indian Territory efforts to recover Fort Smith. In action, his troops 
displayed courage, and much was done for the morale of all Indian 
Territory with the success of the Battle of Poison Spring, but the 
campaign did not bring the desired results for him. 
When it became obvious there was to be little or no help to be 
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had from outside for Indian Territory, Maxey began to use his ,Confeder-
ate troops in harassment raids and demonstrations against Fort Smith 
and Fort Gibson. It was his thought that this would eventually lead 
to the abandonment of the post and in the interim would be a very 
worthwhile military action. The Indians under Watie struck often and 
harshly at haying camps, supply ships, and wagon trains. They managed 
to obtain many necessary supplies for the troops and their families. 
When this activity was terminated by Magruder's request for support, 
Maxey chaffed under the frustration and interferenc.e which he felt 
was adding to the !;>urdel).s_h~ f-~ce_d. -Altho!-!gh __ h_is ma:&te:r pl-an-wa-e Qot_ 
r~;alized before h:j.s _ r_em9val, hi? ac:::ttvJties. _!inp, igea? hag xe~uJted in 
limited military success for his troops and for him personally. 
Maxey's removal was not a repudiation of his administration, but 
the result of the maneuvering of Cooper. Cooper wanted the conunand 
of Indian Territory, and Maxey blocked his path. Cooper did not hesi-
tate to use every means possible to gain his end. He officially com-
plained about Maxey's appointment, his decisions, and his record. He 
agitated among the Indians under his influence, and when he found he 
could not prevail upon Lieutenant General Kirby-Smith to reconsider 
his choice of Maxey, he used his influence with President Davis to 
pressure Kirby-Smith. Kirby-Smith was well pleased with Maxey's 
activities and decisions in Indian Territory and unimpressed with 
Cooper's. Kirby-Sm~th tried every means available to him, every pro-
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test, every possible compromise, including ignoring direct orders, to 
sustain Maxey. He managed to keep him in his position for over seven 
months after President Davis took initial steps to remove Maxey, but 
could not prevail after Cooper made a personal trip to Richmond to 
pressure Davis. Maxey had frustratedly watched Cooper's maneuvering 
but could do little to keep his command. He relied on the support 
of many within his command, upon his superiors, and on his own faith 
in justice, but Cooper won. After his removal, Maxey was assigned to 
a command in Texas, but for only a short while, as the war ended 
within weeks. 
In conclusion, Maxey had arrived in Indian Territory with experi-
ence and personal attributes which set him apart from his predecessors. 
It was hoped that his unique combination of knowledge, talent, intelli-
gence, and personality was proportioned in such a way that he would be 
able to solve the serious problems facing Indian Territory in 1864. In 
most cases the combination proved successful. He accomplished more than 
could be expected of most men under similar circumstances. The troops 
on his arrival were defeated and demoralized, and when he left these 
men could claim military victories, efficient organization, and more 
respect for themselves as well as their commander. He wanted very much 
to succeed as commander of Indian Territory. He was convinced that 
success was vital to the survival not only of northern Texas but the 
entire Confederacy. 
Maxey had exceptional administrative ability, and in quick and 
decisive action he was able to bring order to chaos. His plans for an 
offensive could only be possible if his reconstruction plans could be 
rapidly and effectively executed. However, no matter how diligently 
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Maxey worked, it was impossible to obtain the supplies he needed. The 
official channels could not fulfill his wants, and Maxey was forced to 
use his initiative and imagination to obtain even the basic necessities 
for his troops. He achieved a degree of success. He was able to main-
tain his troops and secure subsistence if not the luxury of abundance 
with which to start a campaign. His efforts to reorganize his troops, 
curb desertions, and inspire spirit and confidence were carefully ad-
ministered and a large part of his success. 
One of the more impressive of Maxey's achievements in Indian 
Territory was his ability to cooperate and work with and for the 
Indians. The support of the Indians was essential to the security of 
Indian Territory. In order to build morale among the Indians and con-
fidence in the Confederacy, Maxey inundated his conµnand with fiery 
speeches and printed propaganda. He was able to keep their faith with 
his fair and impartial treatment. He made a conscious effort to know 
and understand the Indians, and by doing so he was able to appreciate 
their strengths and weaknesses. He took his office as Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs very seriously. He worked hard to obtain funds and 
supplies for the Indians, and fearing the conse.quences of inefficiency 
in the system of supply, he initiated reforms. He expended a great 
deal of time and energy meeting with the Indians and securing a working 
relationship with their leaders. 
Militarily, Maxey was able to achieve victories, not on the 
grandiose scale he had foreseen, but in a modest and positive way. 
Though absolutely defeated mentally and physically in December, 1863, 
the troops under Maxey could and did participate in fighting and 
emerge the conqueror. In Camden, Arkansas, Maxey personally experi-
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enced the satisfaction and excitement of leading his troops into battle 
and winning. His troops proved themselves to be courageous soldiers. 
Maxey and his forces returned to Indian Territory ready and able to 
engage the enemy, but the circumstances would not permit normal action. 
Thus emerged the plan urging harassment and raids, techniques used 
against Fort Smith and Fort Gibson with the purpose of forcing them to 
surrender. These procedures were personal triumphs for Maxey although 
he did not personally engage in the action. They continued to rein-
force and justify his faith in his Indian troops, their leaders, and 
their abilities. But Maxey was fighting hopeless conditions. His 
plans for Indian Territory were sound, but under the supply conditions, 
the dire circumstances of the Confederacy, and the temperamental per-
sonalities of Cooper, Magruder, and others, his ultimate hopes were 
not realized. However, his limited success was enough to sustain 
Indian Territory until the end of the war. 
Maxey's relationships with his fellow officers were a mixture of 
great success and dismal failure. He won a great measure of respect 
and affection from the majority of his subordinates, and his immediate 
-superior, Lieutenant General Kirby-Smith, demonstrated on many 
occasions his respect, affection, and admiration for Maxey. He was 
called on several occasions to prove his loyalty to. Maxey and did so ., 
with no hesitation. But unfortunately, because of conflicting interest, 
Maxey experienced two very unrewarding relationships. His misadventure 
with Major General Magruder was created by misunderstanding and con-
flict of opinion on authority and the proper way to wage war in Arkan-
sas and Indian Territory. This was an understandable conflict between 
two conscientious generals who were vitally interested in their com-
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mands and who felt threatened by each other, The second unhappy re-
lationship was with Cooper and was created not by Maxey but by Cooper. 
Any commander would have received the same treatment as Maxey because 
the ambitious and determined Cooper would stop at nothing to gain his 
ends. Cooper pushed and shoved his way through obstacles made by 
Kirby-Smith and finally was able to obtain the command in Indian Terri-
tory because Maxey had no further recourse for personal support. Maxey 
was helplessly caught in a painful and exasperating situation. He 
could do nothing but continue his job as best he could and place his 
faith in his superior's ability and his own excellent record. 
Uniquely qualified to command in Indian Territory, Maxey met the 
problems of his difficult posit:j.on head-on with determination, opti-
mism, and skill. He transmittep these feelings to the Indians, and 
this resulted in the confidence that they could cope with the enemy. 
From total defeat to even limited success on the battlefield was 
heady tonic for the morale of his forces. He administered and organ-
ized his way to an orderly and systematic military establishment, giv-
ing his troops the Security of being cared for as best as could be 
expected, and a stability and strength in their commander not known 
before. Although most of these achievements were intangible, they 
resulted in limited military victories, more and better supplies, and 
increased security for Indian Territory, northern Texas, and the 
Confederacy. Maxey maintained h:j.s troops in an incredibly difficult 
situation for over a year, fighting racial tension, desertion, poor 
supplies, and Cooper. Although Maxey suffered under the injustice of 
his removal, he had gained much personal satisfaction through diligent 
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